

# 行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫 成果報告

## 量物致知---法稱知識論與邏輯之研究(2/2) 研究成果報告(完整版)

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*A Study on Dharmakirti's Epistemology and Logic*

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## 量物致知---法稱知識論與邏輯之研究

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共同主持人：

計畫參與人員：王書偉、釋大策、釋天禪（兼任助理）

執行機構及單位：南華大學宗教學研究所

#### 一、中英文摘要

本計畫為兩年期計畫，依原先規畫，第一年研究七世紀印度佛教量論哲學家法稱(Dharmakīrti)的知識論，第二年則探討他的邏輯理論。國內佛學、哲學界對中期佛教量論略無研究，希望藉此計畫，透過梵本《釋量論》的詮釋與分析研究，探討法稱量論思想並撰寫相關論文，以增進學界對佛教量論的了解。由於種種因素，計畫實際執行以法稱知識論為主，邏輯理論為輔，目前已完成法稱「自證知」理論的英文論文一篇。

計畫以「文本義理詮釋法」與「哲學分析法」為主要研究方法。就「文本義理詮釋法」而言，直接自法稱梵文原著《釋量論》入手，尋求正確理解文本原義，加以分析與詮釋，以釐清或確認其思想內容。其次藉「哲學分析法」，分析、檢討與反思法稱論點的哲學意含，顯明其成就與限制。本研究也運用西方哲學的概念名相，並以佛教理論與西方相應理論比較。

本計畫執行期間已完成《釋量論·現量品》的閱讀與整理工作，另也閱讀相當數量的法稱知識論與邏輯理論的現代論著。研究成果之一的“Consciousness and Self-awareness”一文，已為某國際期刊所接受。至於探討法稱「無分別知覺」議題的論文則尚未完成，但希望於年底完成，並投稿學術期刊。

關鍵詞：法稱、知覺、自證知、無分別、邏輯理論。

#### Abstract

The present project proceeded for two years. In the first year the focus was on Dharmakīrti's theory of knowledge, while the second year on his logical theory. I intended to look closely into his main work, the *Pramāṇavarttika*, to explore and reveal his epistemological and logical thought.

The research methods followed here are interpretive analysis and philosophical analysis. I resorted to the Sanskrit text of the *Pramāṇavarttika* and made use of Japanese, Chinese and German translations of this and some other texts for my purposes. I also attended to Western

and Indian scholars' relevant treatises as well as certain Western philosophical views or theories to show the achievement and limitation of Dharmakīrti's philosophy.

During the execution of this project, I have written a paper titled "Consciousness and Self-awareness," which has been accepted by *Asian Philosophy* for publication. For some reasons, I was unable to write on Dharmakīrti's theory of logic and the proposed paper on the issue of nonconceptual perception is yet to be completed. It is hoped, however, that the resultant works of the present project would help to deepen our understanding of Dharmakīrti's theory of knowledge.

Keywords: Dharmakīrti, perception, nonconceptual, self-awareness, logical theory.

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## 三、報告內容

### 前言

本計畫為兩年期計畫，依原先規畫，第一年研究法稱(Dharmakīrti)的知識論，第二年則探討他的邏輯理論。國內佛學、哲學界對中期佛教量論略無研究，計畫執行人希望藉此計畫，透過梵本《釋量論》等書的詮釋與分析研究，探討法稱量論思想並撰寫相關論文，以增進學界對佛教量論的了解。不過，由於行政工作繁忙以及撰寫其他論文等因素，計畫執行仍以法稱的知識論為主，探討他的無分別知覺理論以及自證知理論。至於法稱的邏輯理論，雖已有涉獵，但還無完整的研究，尚無法短期內以論文形式發表研究成果。

### 研究目的

印度佛教量論學派以六世紀初的陳那(Dignāga)為建立者，其後，七世紀的佛教哲學家法稱進而宏揚此學，對後世有深遠的影響。法稱一方面繼承陳那的理論，另一方面也發展甚多個人獨特的思想見地。基本上，法稱雖繼承陳那的量論框架，但明顯加入因果理論的色彩。自相---現量知覺的對象---被說為具有有效運作的能力，能實現人所意想的種種目的；相反地，非實在的共相則無此能力。法稱對於概念分別的運作方式有較多的討論，他的邏輯也透過「果性因」與「自性因」等概念，發展出異於陳那的理論格局。凡此種

種，法稱理論的特色、限制與價值，都有待訴諸其原著作深入的研究。

國際間有甚多學者研究法稱邏輯，但對於法稱知識論的研究仍顯不足。尤其是「自證知」概念，部分西方與印度學者似有誤解，希望藉此計畫的執行而有所澄清。另一方面，國內研究佛教量論者寡，對於法稱知識論的內涵亦缺乏深入的探究，本計畫除可充實計畫執行人對法稱知識論與邏輯理論的理解外，或許有助於填補國內學界在中期佛教量論研究的空白。

### 文獻探討

本計畫以法稱《釋量論》的〈現量品〉與〈為自比量品〉為主，並參考其《量抉擇論》的德文譯本(Vetter 1996)。《釋量論》有法尊法師的中譯本，題為《釋量論略解》，唯此書並不精確且不易懂理，僅以之為次要的參考資料。有關原本文獻的探討，留待「研究方法」中敘述，這裡僅扼要論介現代學者的研究成果。

在法稱知識論的研究上，以印度哲學家 B. K. Matilal 的大著 *Perception* 最廣為人所知。Matilal 站在印度教正理學派立場，對佛教量論學派的知覺理論與自證知理論有不少討論與批判。但筆者不同意他偏於以英國經驗論觀點，詮解佛教知識論的作法。G. Dreyfus 的 *Recognizing Reality*，是研究法稱知識論的力作，只是 Dreyfus 的主要參考資料為藏文論書，於梵文著作上仍有引述不足處。個人較肯認日本學者戶崎宏正的《佛教認識論の研究》，此書為法稱《釋量論·現量品》的日譯研究，作者詳細徵引各種梵、藏文注釋資料，解說詳備。不過，戶崎的著作以一般性解釋為主，哲學思惟較弱，個人則希望在梵文原典與戶崎此書的基礎上，進一步從事法稱知識論的哲學探究。

幾年前，*Philosophy East and West* 期刊刊載了 Monima Chadha, Arindam Chakrabarti, Mark Siderits 以及 Stephen H. Philips 等學者，有關是否有「無分別知覺」的論辯文章。此爭辯主要環繞正理學派與佛教量論二者。相關討論引發筆者興趣，將於撰寫中的論文對此問題進行哲學性論述，檢討佛教「無分別知覺」的可能性。為此，個人也需要熟習當代英美分析哲學界對於 nonconceptual content 概念的相關討論；此一問題較複雜，不於此詳述。

就佛教自證知理論的研究而言，除了 Paul Williams 對寂護以及西藏學者相關見解的研究外，中國大陸學者姚治華近著有 *The Buddhist Theory of Self-cognition* 一書，探討「自證知」概念的起源及其於經量部、唯識宗以及陳那處的發展，但對法稱見解則論述不多。此外，J. Ganeri, Arindam Chakrabarti 及 Roy Perrett 等人都有相關論文，這些都對本研究有助益，但也均為個人擬欲檢討的對象。

在法稱邏輯的研究上，Matilal 遺著 *The Character of Logic in India* 論及法稱的邏輯理論，但篇幅不多。國際學界對佛教邏輯的研究，主要見於 Steinkellner (1991)與 Katsura (1999)所編輯的兩本書。此者收錄了為數頗多的國際學者的佛教邏輯論文，極具參考價值。此外，Tillemans (1999)與 Dunne (2004)也都是此領域的佳作。只是個人在法稱邏輯的梵文文本閱讀仍有限，尚無法多加評論。

### 研究方法

本計畫以「文本義理詮釋法」與「哲學分析法」為主要研究方法。就「文本義理詮釋法」言，計畫直接自法稱梵文原著《釋量論》入手，尋求正確理解文本原義，加以分析與詮

釋，以釐清或確認其思想內容。其次藉「哲學分析法」，分析、檢討與反思法稱論點的哲學意含，顯明其成就與限制。執行人也運用西方哲學的概念名相以為分析利器，但又避免誤將西方哲學的思惟框架套在法稱之上，造成不必要的混淆。研究也試著指出及批判部分西方學者的不當誤解。之所以採取這兩種方法，一方面基於所研究文本的屬性，另一方面則是個人興趣與訓練使然。此外，這樣的進路即便在國際學界也仍大有待開發的空間。

計畫之執行步驟擬依據下列次序：(1)資料蒐集；(2)二手資料的閱讀與消化；(3)原典文本義理的詮釋與整理，哲學分析與反思；(4)撰寫相關論文並發表之。就具體執行而言，個人在閱讀部分二手資料後，即進行《釋量論·現量品》的翻譯與詮釋工作。從該品第一頌開始，至最後第 539 頌止，參考戶崎的著作以及法尊的中譯，試著理解各頌意涵，並將大部分的偈頌翻譯為中文，並視需要加上簡短註解。這樣做有助於加深對文本的理解，另外也方便日後的哲學分析與論文寫作。如此完成之後，計約翻譯了 340 餘條偈頌，整個檔案達 33 頁之多。其後，則反覆閱讀其內容，略作修改，並將較重要的偈頌以星號標出。至於《釋量論·為自比量品》，由於剩下時間有限，僅閱讀了六、七十頌，尚未進行翻譯與注釋工作。

在論文寫作方面，原先計畫撰寫三篇論文，但因行政教學工作繁忙，另有其他論文筆債等因素，於計畫期間僅能就法稱知識論部分撰寫兩篇論文。第一篇論文討論法稱對無分別知覺的理解，並檢討此知覺的可能性，先前並擬以「分別與無分別：法稱論感官知覺與概念知」為題。由於對哲學分析與比較哲學的興趣，覺得有必要閱讀西方學者對感官知覺的 nonconceptual content 概念的論述，加上需於去年十一月參加台大哲學系主辦的國際哲學會議，發表第二篇論文，以致該論文寫作工作中斷。目前，正著手閱讀西方哲學相關論著，希望在年底前完成本論文初稿。第二篇論文論述法稱的自證知理論，撰寫完成後以“Consciousness and Self-awareness: A Buddhist Epistemological Perspective”為題，口頭發表於台大哲學系主辦的國際會議--International Conference on the Interaction of Concepts between Eastern and Western Philosophy。其後再加以修改，並以“Consciousness and Self-awareness”為題，投稿至 *Asian Philosophy* 期刊。法稱邏輯理論方面，目前也已閱讀了不少二手資料，但由於法稱著作的研讀進度落後，暫打消撰寫論文的初衷，看未來情況再說。

## 結果與討論

本計畫執行環繞三個主題：(1)法稱的無分別知覺理論，(2)法稱的自證知理論，以及(3)法稱的邏輯理論。以下就此主題，進行計畫執行結果的陳述與討論。

先陳述已完成的論文。法稱的自證知理論承繼自陳那，後者主張我人心識均具有三部分，亦即，見分、相分與自證分。「自證分」概念表明，我人藉心識活動以認識外物的同時，亦了知著具有見、相二分的心識活動本身，此知即為自證知。此觀點為法稱所繼承，但有更詳細的討論與發展。所撰寫的論文旨在探討法稱對於「心識」與「自證知」的理解，並考察他的相關論證。此論文採解釋與比較分析的進路，因而也與西方哲學的相似觀點比較，顯示佛教自證知理論的特殊性與似真性。本論文第一節為前言，第二節介紹佛教量論學者對知覺與心識結構的看法，並指出其與西方笛卡兒式心物二元論及英國經驗論的差異。第三節討論法稱對「相分」概念的看法。第四節分析討論「自證知」

概念，指出其與經驗論相應概念的差異，隱隱回應 Ganeri, Chakrabarti 與 Perrett 的可能誤解。第五節檢討法稱的相關論證，第六節則為結論。

本論文題為“Consciousness and Self-awareness”，日前已為英國出版的 *Asian Philosophy* 期刊所接受。論文以「附錄」方式，附於報告末尾。此處不另贅述，僅就其學術貢獻說明如下：

- (1) 顯示佛教學論的「相分」概念，雖不脫「知覺的帷幕」的窘境，但似無西方經驗論的 sense data 概念及知覺表象論的其他理論困難。本文以佛教理論為一種顯現理論(theory of appearance)，除與 William Alston 的 theory of appearing 比較外，也嘗試顯示此論的似真性。
- (2) 闡述「自證知」之為非概念、前反省、默會的識知活動，並無近代英美經驗論者的 introspection 觀的內在問題。檢討法稱辯護「自證知」的論證，討論法稱理論與當代歐陸現象學的相應見解的相似性與差異性。
- (3) 顯示此理論雖不無疑義，此知與身體意識或一同構成我人意識生活的默會(tacit)面向，以致此理論仍具有其現代價值，而值得我人重視。

在法稱的無分別知覺理論方面，撰寫中的論文討論以下三點：(1)法稱對於感官知覺之屬性及其對象的觀點，(2)概念分別與共相的屬性，(3)無分別知覺是否可能。法稱承接陳那，以現量知覺以自相為對象，而現量知不雜有概念分別，是以知覺的對象如其所是地顯現，並無任何與語言、概念的聯繫。另一方面，法稱以共相為概念分別與語言運用的產物，虛妄不實。此中第一點的討論頗為重要，因為佛教學者以特殊的方式理解感官知覺的對象：此是一無結構的、純然特殊的事物，如色聲香味觸等。由於概念分別涉及對象的結構化，唯有無分別知覺才能如實呈現此對象。例如，法稱在《釋量論·現量品》中提出不少論證，尋求顯示知覺的無分別性，其中的一個論證可以例示如下：

- (1) 真實存在的對象是闕無任何「能限定-所限定」架構的無結構對象。
- (2) 能限定-所限定架構之於我人意識中的呈現，其實是概念分別的結果。
- (3) 真正的知覺如其所是地呈現真實存在的對象。
- (4) 因此，真正的知覺〔應該〕是無概念分別的。

顯然地，這論證是規定式(prescriptive)的，很難說服其反對者。

第二點有關概念分別的屬性，此一問題並不易釐清。法稱以概念與語言是互相依待的，即概念生起語言，語言生起概念。但他也同意，未學習語言的嬰兒或一般動物，也具有概念分別的作用或能力。重要的是，概念作用引生共相的置定或投射，後者非為真實世界的內容。從這裡也可看出，我人並不宜以過於廣義的方式理解「概念分別」一概念，而若以較狹義的方式理解，則我人或可對「無分別知覺是否可能」問題，給出較同情式的肯定答案。相反地，部分學者傾向採廣義方式理解，以致提出「無分別，即無認識」的質難；但這樣的理解未必能夠成立。當然，這議題相當複雜，還有待較細部的爬梳。於第三點處，除了先前的論證外，法稱於《釋量論》裡還有其他論證支持其「真正的知覺是無分別的」的論點，只是依個人之見，這些論證都各有其理論問題，難以全然信服其對手。

如前述，Chadha, Chakrabarti, Siderits 以及 Philips 等國際學者曾就「無分別知覺是否可能」一議題進行論辯。個人於論文中也參考及批判他們的見解，對此問題進行深入的哲學論述。首先，Chakrabarti 認為，seeing is not possible without recognizing，其理由

是：即使是觀見自相為「獨特而無可範疇化的」某物，也仍是將之見為是「某物」，某種概念運作是現行的，以致並無所謂的無分別知覺。他以在此情況，某種否定性的實指概念(negative demonstrative covering concept)是現存的。相似地，Chadha 認為，佛教學者的「無分別知覺」概念使其無法適當地解釋心識意向活動中的基本的「對象辨認」(object-identification)作用，如此一來，佛教學者將無法解釋知覺活動中的「意向性」或「對象導向性」一基本特徵。她進一步指出，「自相的無分別知覺」一概念是不融貫的，因為，既無概念分別的介入，則無法將知覺對象辨識為是某個自相，並與其他自相區隔開來，因而無法成其為「自相的知覺」。

Chakrabarti 與 Chadha 都已觸及此問題的核心，只是，他們的論述也都有規定性嫌疑，亦即規定知覺必須含有概念分別。如前已述，此中一個問題自然在於如何理解「概念分別」一概念，就個人而言，如果我人不對此概念做過於廣義的理解，則無分別知覺應是可能的，而意向性本身也未必與之牴觸。於無分別知覺中，我人自然仍可見到事物之間的分別，只是沒有將此分別概念化為「這是某物」、「這不同於 X, Y, Z」等。這裡的知是非決定性的，非一般認知式的。譬如說，它並不是 seeing-that〔如「這是花」〕或 seeing-as〔如「這(as qualified by)花」〕，充其量只能說是 seeing-what〔法稱曾暗示無分別知覺的對象是一 what (Skt. kim)〕。筆者以 seeing-what 與 knowing-what 概念表明，這裡並沒有概念的運作，甚至沒有「這」、「那」等實指概念的作用。當然，反對者會以為，當我見到一朵不知名、先前從未見過的花時，我還是會於心中生起「花」的概念，甚至「那」的概念，而這已涉及概念分別。此說的確有其見地，也常被提出以顯明知覺的概念分別性。但問題是：是否類似的概念一定會生起呢？很難說一定是這樣。特別是在新生知覺的第一剎那，我人有可能只是非決定地知覺該花，尚未以之為此或為彼，而這種非決定性或可為 what 字所表達。重點是，只要我人確能有相關的無分別知覺，不管其如何地罕見，這已足以為佛教的無分別知覺理論辯護。

當然，這只是簡略地觸及問題關鍵，我人還是需要回到文本，探討法稱支持「無分別知覺」的相關論證。此則涉及問題頗廣，無法再此一一詳述。值得注意的是，當今國際量論學界頗普遍地傾向不認同佛教的論點，認為感官知覺不免雜有概念分別。這點多少是因受到當代西方哲學界「語言的轉向」學風影響所致。即以同情佛教量論立場的 Siderits 為例，他雖然認許「無分別知覺」的可能性，卻錯誤地以佛教學者持外在論(externalism)立場，亦即主張心識內容並不必為知覺主體所經驗。他認為，佛教量論學者對於無分別知覺的見解，代表一種有關心識內容的極端的外在論觀點：I am never able to say anything concerning what it is that I am conscious of in such episodes; instead the content is to be determined 'externally' by looking to see what it is that caused the state。Siderits 的這個論點完全忽視了法稱等人的「自證知」主張，這主張與他所謂的外在論顯然相違。從此也可看出，「無分別知覺」論點對於現代人而言極不討喜，遂而有 Siderits 的「善意」的曲解。筆者希望能夠稍扭轉此一傾向。

有關「無分別知覺」可能性的問題，其實涉及晚近英美分析哲學界對 nonconceptual content 概念的相關討論。由於本論文的進路屬性，還需閱讀諸如 John McDowell 的 *Mind and World* 以及 York H. Gunther 所編的 *Essays on Nonconceptual Content* 等書，並以法稱的論證與西方學者論點相比較〔二者不無相似處〕，也因此此論文的完成尚需一些時日。當然，此問題取決於我人對「概念分別」的理解，執行人傾向認為，無分別知覺是



可能的，只是這知覺很難對知覺者開顯一「外在世界」。另一方面，法稱的論證往往有其問題，而我人也應該肯認有分別「知覺」的知覺性格。

在邏輯理論方面，法稱提出「自性相屬關係」概念，以為因宗不相離關係的普遍的、決定性的基礎。此關係將因法決定性地繫屬至所立法，因法是能繫屬者、能依待者、能知者，宗法是所繫屬者、所依待者、所知者。在此關係下，僅有「自性因」、「果性因」與「不可得因」三者能為正因，而正因即能保證論證的真確性。要言之，陳那邏輯是開放性的，所謂的「三相具足」之因，並不保證論證的真確性；法稱則改革陳那的比量理論，其邏輯似乎是完整自足的。這點可說是法稱邏輯超越前人之處。但連帶地，法稱需要重新理解「不共不定因」與「相違決定因」。對他而言，表現為同喻體的 *anvaya* (合) 與表現為異喻體的 *vyatireka* (離) 是等值的，其一成立，另一即成立，這影響他對如「所聞性」等因——依陳那之見，此為不共不定因——的理解。基本上，對於似乎三相具足、但其實有問題的因法，法稱的態度是強調說，這樣的因法其實並未真的具備因三相。實則對法稱而言，每一相的考量都要求決定性，即如宗有法需要決定性地具有因法，異品需要決定性地遍無因法等。無論如何，前此的進路似乎頗為牽強。

在為他比量方面，法稱以基於三相之因的因、喻論式已是正確的為他推論，或許因此宗言並無必要。〔對陳那而言，因法之具足三相並不意味著宗言一定正確，因此需要提出宗支。〕於法稱的《因滴論》裡，宗支不再是論式的一支，他甚至認為，如果我人陳述了具有三相的因法，則不會有宗的過失，他因此以「似宗」概念為無用。法稱的新論有其超越陳那之處，但也有新衍生的問題，雖說部分的新見解或許於陳那的《集量論》已可見端倪。無論如何，計畫執行人對法稱邏輯理論的研究尚欠完整，不少議題還有待未來賡續探討。

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## 五、計畫成果自評

如前述，本計畫執行以法稱知識論為主，邏輯理論為輔，與原先規劃有異。除了先前〔現已卸任〕的主管行政工作與非關本計畫的論文撰寫外，由於執行人尋求撰寫英文論文投稿國際期刊，國際期刊的學術嚴格性也使寫作上必須更為審慎踏實，是以無法依原先規劃撰寫法稱邏輯的論文。不過，相關文本與論文的閱讀，已有助於深化個人對法稱邏輯理論的了解，加以因參與政治大學哲學系林鎮國教授主持的國科會哲學學門人才培育計畫「佛教知識論研究」系列活動，有機會聆聽日本龍谷大學桂紹隆教授與瑞士洛桑大學 Tom Tillemans 教授對佛教邏輯的講演，也增進相關領域的學識。

就古典文獻運用方面，執行人日、德文閱讀能力欠佳，相關文獻涉獵仍嫌不足。就本計畫的研究，除了法稱《釋量論》梵本的閱讀外，也宜參考後法稱之佛教學者對《釋量論》的註釋；但由於梵文原典本不易閱讀，因此在這方面，主要仍參考戶崎宏正《佛教認識論の研究》所引梵文註釋，未能更直接地運用相關梵文資料。也因此，本研究在原典參考文獻的運用上仍有待加強。

在義理詮釋與哲學分析上，本研究尋求正確理解文本原意，加以分析與詮釋，釐清其思想內容，進而檢討反思相關論點的哲學意含，顯明法稱理論的成就與限制。執行人在執行上大抵已能把握這些要點，整體上個人覺得問題較少，雖說這仍需要從未來發表的論文來客觀評量。

研究成果之一的論文“Consciousness and Self-awareness”，有如先前所提的學術貢獻。本論文初稿於國內研討會發表時，曾獲也在場的 Tillemans 教授稱許，修改後投稿 *Asian Philosophy* 且已為所接受，其整體內容應不差。就個人觀點，此論文因篇幅限制等因素，某些論點未多加說明或發揮，另外論及現象學家的相應觀點處稍嫌簡略。再者，法稱對於「自證知」的支持論證相當多，部分論證複雜難理，論文在此方面未能較完整地討論其論證，應是這篇論文的主要缺憾。本論文預定於今年十一月出版。

有關「無分別知覺」的論文，仍以英文撰寫中。由於需閱讀某些英文哲學文獻，未能在計畫結束時完成，是有待改進之處。此論文所涉及的問題並不易處理，個人雖已有基本定見，但還難確定其最後結論。基本上，法稱的相關論證大都有問題，還需要參考西方學者觀點再行補強或發展。另一方面，國際印度哲學學者對法稱見解多半採取懷疑

或否定的態度，此論文或可以顯示法稱理論的價值，至少可以提供相關問題的不同的觀看視野。個人將進而完成此篇論文，並尋求於學術期刊發表。

## 六、附錄

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# Consciousness and Self-awareness

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[Note: this is a preprint of an article submitted for consideration in the *Asian Philosophy* (copyright: Taylor & Francis)]

## I

When I see a squirrel on a kapok tree, am I simultaneously aware of my seeing the squirrel? When I think of a scheduled meeting this afternoon, do I also cognize that I am so thinking? When one knows something, does one also know that one knows? These are questions related to the notion of self-consciousness or self-awareness. This notion takes many forms, and the one concerning us in this essay may be explicated as the following self-awareness thesis: that our consciousness is always pre-reflectively and nonconceptually aware of itself or its content. Thus, the word ‘self’ in ‘self-awareness’ refers, not to one’s self or ego, but to consciousness itself.

The Indian Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (c. 480-540 CE) may be the first in global philosophy to articulate an epistemological theory of self-awareness (*svasaṃvitti*). The theory was later defended and developed by Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660 CE). Their school is generally known as the Buddhist epistemological school. The doctrine of this school is largely non-idealistic with influences from the realist tenets of the Buddhist Sautrāntika school. It, however, is eventually idealistic, embodying an epistemological defense of the metaphysical idealism of Yogācāra Buddhism, which denies the existence of an independent world external to consciousness. To my mind, the two Buddhist thinkers endorsed the aforesaid self-awareness thesis. Various views positing self-awareness or the like have been held by a number of Western philosophers from Descartes onward, and the issue still draws attention from contemporary thinkers of both the Continental and the Anglo-American philosophical worlds.

In this essay I propose to inquire into the Buddhist understanding of the notions of

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consciousness and of self-awareness and examine his argumentation for the thesis. Adopting an approach of interpretive and comparative analysis, I shall skip over the related historical narrative but attend to Western philosophy for comparisons and elucidations.<sup>1</sup> It is hoped that our analysis would help shed light on the peculiarity and plausibility of the Buddhist theory of self-awareness.

## II

Following a long tradition, the Buddhist epistemologist posits six types of consciousness, that is, five sense consciousnesses (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile consciousness) and mental consciousness as the sixth consciousness. Sense consciousness always functions nonconceptually, while mental consciousness is either conceptual or nonconceptual. For the Buddhist, only a nonconceptual awareness or awareness-episode provides us with undistorted access to things as they are in themselves. The things are momentary particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), physical or otherwise, which constitute whatever there are in actuality. By contrast, a conceptual awareness has as its direct object a thing in its generic aspect or simply a universal, which is non-effective and unreal, standing in sharp contrast to the reality of particulars.

As a genuine perception (*pratyakṣa*) supposedly presents to the perceiver a particular in its original, undistorted existence, the Buddhist takes nonconceptualness to be the defining feature of perception. To our contemporary mind, this seems astonishing, perhaps totally unacceptable: though sense perception may have a nonconceptual content, it typically involves conceptual structuring. Here is not the place to dwell on the issue. The basic point is that for the Buddhist conception or thought, operating in the realms of generality or semblance, is occluding and distorting with respect to the true state of real particulars, and so a genuine perception must be crystal-clear to reveal the particulars as such and nothing more. Incidentally, conception and language are in this school considered intrinsically correlated; hence, the perception must be nonverbal or pre-linguistic as well.

Influenced by modern Western epistemology, contemporary scholars writing on the subject tend to impose on the Buddhist the Cartesian and British empiricist notions of mind or consciousness. This epistemology is conditioned by Cartesian dualism as well as modern science. Here, one's mind forms a private, privileged subjective realm severed from the external world and other minds, and consciousness is usually likened to a spotlight in the stage of a self-enclosed mind. Sense perception, then, occurs as the result of a physical-physiological-psychical causal chain, or, as Ryle (1949, p. 243) puts it, 'my mind can get in touch with a gate-post, only if the gate-post causes something to go on in my body,

which in its turn causes something else to go on in my mind.’ For Berkeley and his contemporaries, the immediate object of sight is two-dimensional and so distance cannot be seen, ‘for, distance ... projects only one point in the fund of the eye, which point remains invariably the same, whether the distance be longer or shorter’ (Berkeley, 1965, p. 285). The immediate object of sight turns out to be the image on the retina of the eye.

Cartesian dualism is arguably absent from Indian epistemology and the Buddhist epistemologist came on the scene too early to know anything about modern science. On his non-idealistic view, a sense consciousness-episode arises from the coming together of an external object, an (outer) sense as a subtle material faculty residing in the sense organ, and a preceding consciousness-episode. Some Indian epistemologists fancied that for me to see a star in a dark sky, my visual sense has to find its way to, and get in touch with, the star. To the Buddhist, contrarily, in visual and auditory perceptions this ‘coming together’ does not demand any actual sense-object contact. Nor does it demand a mediated process. One naturally wonders how sense perception can arise without sense-object contact. But, although the functioning of visual and auditory senses is not clearly explained in the school, it is patently a far cry from sensory stimulation and all that.

For the Buddhist, consciousness is not a property of mental states in a mental theater; it is instead equivalent to the mind. Further, the defining characteristic of the mind or consciousness is neither thought nor intentionality, but experiencing (*anubhava*). This means that a consciousness-episode is basically an experience as typically understood by contemporary philosophers. Now, a consciousness-episode is generally intentional in the sense that an apprehending act of consciousness is directed toward an external object through an ‘intentionally’ immanent apprehended form or appearance seemingly knit with the object. When I, for example, see smoke on a distant hill and infer the presence of fire there, my conceptual act of inference is directed toward the real fire on the hill through a conceptual fire-form immanent in my consciousness. This form is imaginal in nature and is imposed in the form of an (unreal) fire-universal onto the hill to give rise to the cognition that the hill is fiery. In perceiving an external fire-particular, on the other hand, my perceiving act is directed to the particular through a nonconceptual fire-form that presents the object as it is. As my sense or consciousness perceives the object, the perceiving act is directly aware of the form, which may, to distinguish it from the perceived object, be characterized as the *perceptum qua perceptum*.

A consciousness-episode, then, embodies within itself an apprehending-apprehended correlation. Here an intentional awareness or experience may be taken to consist of an

apprehending act and an apprehended form or appearance, with the two forming an internal duality. The act is the core of the awareness. The form exists not precisely in the act itself but in the awareness and is the intentional object of the act, through which the act is directed to an external thing as its intended object. Just in this sense the form is above said to be intentionally immanent in consciousness.

This internal correlation, nevertheless, does not exhaust the content of consciousness. For the Buddhist, consciousness is intrinsically self-aware in that we in ordinary life are aware of an awareness that has the act as its core and is endowed with the form. Put differently, consciousness is constantly aware of itself involving such an awareness. There is then in consciousness a self-awareness accounting for this ‘being aware of.’ Since both the act and the form are present to and known by self-awareness, Dignāga also refers to them respectively as self-appearance (*svābhāsa*) and objectual appearance (*viṣayābhāsa*). Here the word ‘self’ in ‘self-appearance’ is used either because the awareness-act is conventionally (but not ultimately in this system) taken to be the core of consciousness or because the act appears as a subject rather than an object.

Thus, consciousness consists of the three aspects: self-awareness, self-appearance (viz. awareness-act), and objectual appearance. These aspects, significantly, are not separate from each other, but together form an intrinsic unity.<sup>ii</sup> They are mutually distinguishable, yet distinguishability is different from separability. Dharmakīrti implies that the distinction between them is more nominal or notional than substantial, that any substantial differentiation thereof is rather a result of conceptual imposition, by no means reflecting the way consciousness really is.<sup>iii</sup>

From the perspective of his metaphysical idealism, the Buddhist may even dismiss the veridicality of the two appearances; the latter are erroneous, being present only due to the functioning of subliminal conceptual traces (PV III 212, 320-322, 331, 353). There would then be a non-dual, self-aware pure consciousness void of the aforesaid internal correlation. This, however, will not concern us here. I understand that the Buddhist generally accepts the reality of the external world and takes consciousness to involve the three minimally distinguishable aspects.

### III

The notion of objectual appearance in the case of sense perception sounds like a sense datum. And the Buddhist theory of sense perception is broadly a form of representative realism. While not disputing such connections in a big way, I propose in this section to delve into the notion for certain clarifications.

To begin with a conundrum about sense perception. While the object in the world stands external to the perceiver, it is in some sense given 'in' sense experience; that is, sense experience, presumably subjective in nature, seems to 'possess' the object. But, how can the experience and its object be internally united? How can the blue color of my shirt I am seeing be a property of my visual experience? Or, how can the knowing contain what is known? (Cf. Drummond, 2003, p. 65) We need, perhaps, to distinguish between the blue color as an objective property of my shirt and the blue color as visually experienced as such, the latter being a color *quale* forming a portion of my experience. According to Dharmakīrti, if two items are mutually distinct, they would not always be experienced together. Now that (given self-awareness) the experientially known object and the knowing awareness-act are always experienced together, they must intrinsically be united and any cognition of their separation must be illusory (PV III 387-390, 508). Hence, the known object as such is not really external to the knowing experience and this might explain our common sense intuition that the object seems to figure *in* sense experience. The objectual appearance as what is perceptually known as such is immanent in experience or, as the Buddhist would say, in consciousness.

This view aside, Dharmakīrti, like modern day sense-datum theorists, also appeals to illusion and hallucination to argue for the existence of objectual appearance (e.g. PV III 402-406). His main argument, however, is based on the case of memory and may be rephrased as follows (PV III 373-374, 422-424):

- A1: The recollection of a past external object arises owing to either a past sense experience of the object or the past object itself.
- A2: At the time of recollection the object is already past and cannot function to cause the recollection.
- A3: The recollection, then, arises owing to a past sense experience of the object.
- A4: If the experience is devoid of the immanent appearance of the object, the recollection will not have the object's appearance, which it does have.
- A5: If all such experiences are devoid of the immanent appearances of their objects, the recollections based on them could well be mutually indistinguishable, which is absurd.
- A6: Therefore, the sense experience or awareness of an external object must possess an immanent appearance of the object.

One, of course, can just dispute A1 by contending that the recollection actually arises owing to the traces the sense-perceived external object directly left in our memory bank or subliminal

consciousness. Dharmakīrti does not consider this alternative. His argument, it seems, implicitly hangs on the co-givenness of the experiencing act and its experienced object, which in turn hinges upon the functioning of self-awareness.

How shall we account for the relationship between the objectual appearance and the concerned external object? It is above said that the objectual appearance is seemingly knit with the object and, in the case of sense perception, presents the object as it is. Dignāga thus speaks of what happens when a sense and an object come together to generate a sense awareness:

In whatever form an object appears (*pratibhāti*) in, or enters (*niviśate*) into, an awareness as something white, etc., the object is known just in that form. (Cf. Hattori, 1968, p. 104)

So, the relation is that of an external object *entering into* or *appearing in* consciousness. There is nothing like a long causal chain or a subject-object chasm, for the object seems to have its own form directly *moving* (*saṁkrānti*; PV III 266, 480) *into* consciousness. The external object, to be sure, does not really enter into consciousness. It remains something external. Indeed, the Buddhist embraces a theory of momentariness such that the moment the awareness possessing the intentional form arises the object *per se* has just vanished. Still, the form or appearance comes right from the object.

The Buddhist's is basically a theory of appearance and may be compared with the theory of appearing recently rejuvenated forcefully by William Alston (1999). On Alston's view, to have a sense experience is for an external object to *appear* to the subject as such and such, to look red or round or drifting or like a balloon. Here, the appearing relation is irreducible to theoretically more fundamental factors, and the subject enjoys direct, unmediated awareness of the external object, although the object need not be presented in its genuine form to the subject. In Alston's theory the immediate object of sense awareness is an external object that appears, whereas for the Buddhist it would be the object's appearance in the awareness. In the Buddhist view, for a physical object O really to appear *to* a consciousness C, it must appear *in* C as well. There is nothing badly paradoxical here, as a thin line is drawn between an appearing object (external to consciousness) and its resultant appearance (immanent in consciousness). Despite such significant differences, there are similarities between the two theories. The Buddhist stresses the semblance in form between the object and its appearance. The experience of a red balloon as green is not veridical, because the appearing balloon is not green in color. And in veridical experience of a red balloon-shaped appearance the external



object is known just in that form. The Buddhist, further, would agree with Alston that if  $O$  appears  $P$  to  $C$  and  $O = Q$ , then  $Q$  appears  $P$  to  $C$ , though, surely, from the fact that  $P$  is immanently known by  $C$  it does not necessarily follow that some  $P$ -looking object exists external to  $C$ .

Alston's theory does catch some of our commonsensical intuitions about the mechanism of perception. He, however, acknowledges that hallucination constitutes a problem for the theory. It is a partly submerged stick that appears bent to the perceiver. But what was the real thing there that appeared to Macbeth as a dagger? At one stage Alston (1999, p. 191) leans toward holding that the thing was the air occupying the region where the dagger appeared to be. If so, consider the Buddhist favorite case of 'seeing' an unreal second moon, a case that lies between illusion and hallucination. What thing is there that appears as the second moon? It seems absurd to say it is the air or some physical thing occupying that sky-high region where the second moon appears to be that so appears. It might not fare better to take one single celestial body to appear veridically as the first moon *and* illusorily as the second moon. Alston (pp. 191-192) later resorts to the notion of mental image to account for that which appears in hallucination. Nevertheless, if one is ready to accept mental image, the Buddhist would think it better to posit the existence of objectual appearance. We will then have two qualitatively similar moon-appearances, with one coming from the appearing external moon, the other erroneously caused by some additional factors related to the eyes.

The Buddhist theory of appearance seems broadly a form of representative realism. Now, if for a subject  $S$  to perceive an external object  $O$ ,  $O$  has to send its representation  $R_1$  to confront  $S$ , who then perceives  $R_1$ , then, for  $S$  to perceive  $R_1$ , we may need a second representation  $R_2$ , and so on ad infinitum. This is a charge often leveled against representative realism. However, the objectual appearance is not a distinctive objectified delegate dispatched by an aloof-standing object. It is just what the external object appears in consciousness, or the object taken precisely as it is presented in sense experience, with the experience being nonconceptual and so not really objectifying. Being an integral phase of consciousness, there is no need for the appearance to enter into it again and no infinite regress is in the offing. In fact, the appearance may better be viewed as an intentional *presentation* of the external object, for it intentionally presents the object as such and such to an awareness-act. It is also held that the appearance generally looks as it were something external. The external object quasi-causally appears as the immanent appearance, while the appearance experientially appears to be something external (in different senses of 'appear,' of course).

This discussion shows that it makes sense to take, as the Buddhist does, an external

particular to be the object of sense perception. The particular, causally co-generating the perception, may be said to be the object insofar as ‘its’ appearance is immanently experienced in the perception. So, although I do not directly visually experience a squirrel, I am entitled to say I *see* it if this little animal, while causing my visual experience, appears in my consciousness in the form of its semblance. Though a causal factor for the experience, by contrast, my visual sense is *not* what I see, as it does not so appear (PV III 367-369). This suggests that the Buddhist theory is immune from the criticism Alston (1999, pp. 193-195) puts forth against the sense datum and the adverbial theories of perceptual consciousness to the effect that the theories fail to explain adequately how an object not presented to sense awareness can rightly be regarded as the object of sense perception. It remains true, however, that in the theory one never directly experiences a sensible particular, that the existence of such particulars is only inferentially or conceptually known (PV III 348, 390-391). As a result, the objectual appearance still acts as a ‘veil of perception,’ despite a thin and seemingly translucent one, between us and the external world. Given his theory of momentariness, incidentally, the Buddhist has some difficulties explaining how and why one can be sure that a given sense perception is veridical and counts for the perceiver as a knowledge-episode. But I shall skip this issue as it is not our main concern here.

In accord with his understanding of the six types of consciousness, the Buddhist epistemologist actually takes the object of sense perception to be color, sound, smell, and the like. So, instead of seeing a squirrel, I see something brown or some squirrel-shaped brown color, though the Buddhist does speak conventionally of seeing a jar, a cow, and so on. The Buddhist denies the existence both of a substantial self and of a composite substance like a house or a tree. This does not mean that a sensible particular or its correlated appearance is simply a quality. The particular is neither a substance nor a quality, but something prior to the substance-quality differentiation. Indeed, properties (*dharmas*) and property-bearers (*dharmins*) are both conceptually constructed, in no way present to sense perception (PV III 232). And, we may add, it is by dint of conception that one ‘sees’ discrete color patches or enduring composites bearing universals and membrane-like qualities. Similarly with the appearance. Perception being nonconceptual, we do not see the appearance *as* tri-dimensional, yet it is not thereby two-dimensional.

Space prohibited, I cannot here show on a large scale that the oft-raised objections against the sense datum theory are either inapplicable to the Buddhist theory or are themselves unfounded. Still, a few more points may briefly be added here. First, one commits a categorical mistake by labeling an awareness as red or brown. But, it does not seem mistaken

to speak of an awareness bearing a red or brown intentional appearance. Second, there is no rule prescribing that, say, a squirrel-shaped item must occupy physical space. We definitely can have a squirrel-shaped appearance that does not occupy physical space, just as mental images and dreamt objects that are shaped do not. The appearance exists in consciousness, and the Buddhist was joined by some of his Hindu rivals in taking consciousness to be endowed with a *form*. Finally, it is not incoherent to maintain that something can both be a genuine object of sense awareness and also existentially dependent on the awareness. The problem would only occur if the appearance is generated by the awareness-act of which it is the object, whereas the fact for the Buddhist is that the appearance and the act are together generated by causal factors extrinsic to them.

#### IV

With Cartesian mind-body dualism, the anxiety of not being able to know the outer world properly is pleasingly compensated by privileged and mistaken-proof access to the inner world. It was then held by Descartes, Locke and others that one is simultaneously and infallibly cognizant of one's private mental states or acts. Here, the states or acts either occur consciously, being self-intimating, or are, at least in some cases, known by introspection (Ryle, 1949, pp. 154-156). This view has quite completely lost favor with contemporary philosophers of mind. Now, though some scholars may think otherwise,<sup>iv</sup> I believe that the Buddhist notion of self-awareness differs significantly from the relevant Cartesian notions. In this section I shall elucidate the Buddhist notion and clear away some possible or actual Cartesian misunderstandings that may result in total rejection of the notion. I will not, however, attempt to detail all the differences between the two groups.

Our main uneasiness about the tenability of the general notion of self-awareness or self-cognition concerns its apparent counter-intuitive character: when I see a squirrel as a squirrel, I am not thinking that I see a squirrel as such. It is wrong to hold that an 'I cognize that' thought accompanies all experience; it is as mistaken believing that the concept of seeing is invariably involved in all visual experience. If the conceptual intentional content of a consciousness-episode is properly expressible as 'a squirrel is over there,' then no room is left in the same consciousness-episode for the thought expressed as 'I am seeing something.' For Descartes, to be conscious is to think and to reflect on one's mental occurrences. It is only natural that when he and like-minded thinkers claim that as we see, hear, hope, recall, or feel a pain, we, as thinking intelligent beings, infallibly know that we do so, they lean toward holding the counter-intuitive view questioned here. At least, some conceptual objectification and scrutiny of one's mental occurrences are required to make for the mistaken-proof access

to the inner world.

This issue, nevertheless, does not post a problem to the Buddhist epistemologist. For him, whereas different types of consciousness may function at the same time, no two distinct conceptual contents of mental consciousness can exist together. One cannot, that is, concurrently think the two distinct thoughts: ‘A squirrel is over there’ and ‘I am having a visual perception.’ Dharmakīrti in fact makes use of this point to argue for the existence of nonconceptual sense perception and self-awareness. To rephrase his arguments (PV III 175 and 177-178):

B1: As I observe the screen of my notebook, I also tacitly hear the rain dropping on the roof of my study.

B2: My observation of the screen is conceptual.

B3: No two conceptual awarenesses can occur simultaneously.

B4: Therefore, my hearing of the rain must be nonconceptual.

C1: As I cognize a blue object as blue, I am also tacitly aware of my so cognizing.

C2: My cognition of the blue object is conceptual.

C3: No two conceptual awarenesses can occur simultaneously.

C4: Therefore, my awareness of the cognition must be nonconceptual.

Of course, the arguments could only show that there are tacit nonconceptual perceptions and that if tacit self-awareness exists it must be nonconceptual. But the point for us is that self-awareness as construed by the Buddhist is mostly tacit or non-attentive. It figures tacitly right as we engage ourselves in seeing, feeling, scrutinizing, wishing, expecting, or imagining some external object. Self-awareness is by definition nonconceptual, and given that the intentional structure embedded in sense perception is absent here, the Buddhist is in a better position to assert the conception-free nature of self-awareness than that of sense perception. Self-awareness is non-intentional as well as non-objectifying. Indeed, the beauty of the Buddhist notion is that even when one is conceptually directed at an external object one is still nonconceptually aware of one’s being so directed. The same awareness is *conceptual* in relation to its object and *nonconceptual* in relation to itself. Nonconceptual awareness, then, is forever present in our waking life.

The Buddhist takes self-awareness to be a form of knowing (*pramā*).<sup>v</sup> Now, when I inferentially know that the hill is fiery, do I at the same time know that I am so knowing? In a

way the answer has to be *no*. The Buddhist self-awareness is not a *knowing-that*, if such a knowing is by nature or definition concept-charged. Self-awareness is not a fact-awareness properly expressible as, say, ‘that I am inferring the presence of fire on the hill.’<sup>vi</sup> The knowing that is self-awareness may best be called *knowing-what*.<sup>vii</sup> A knowing-what is a veridical nonconceptual awareness whose ‘object’ is too interwoven with the awareness to be directly and properly expressible. (Language is correlated with thought, yet thinking of an item necessitates the objectification or distancing of that item.) There is involved in the awareness no subject/predicate concept like ‘I,’ ‘see’ or ‘hill,’ not even a demonstrative concept like ‘this’ or ‘that.’ Hence, the indefinite word ‘what.’ A presumably more acceptable case of knowing-what is our body-awareness. We constantly feel our own body from within. The felt body must be distinguished from the physical body observable from without. Although we know how it is or feels for us to live in our body, we cannot properly express the felt content of body-awareness. We cannot *tell the tale* of what it is like to have a body. Likewise, words fail to represent the content of self-awareness or what it is like to see something smoky, to infer an unseen fire, to intend to go to the hill, and so forth. All experience, anyhow, is self-aware in that there is something it is like for a person to undergo an experience.<sup>viii</sup>

For Dharmakīrti both conceptual and nonconceptual knowings are veridical or non-erroneous. This means that self-awareness is not erroneous. When I am in pain, I must be self-aware, in the mode of knowing-what, of my pain-sensation. Nevertheless, given the mostly tacit and intrinsically nonconceptual nature of self-awareness it is not averred that I make no mistake about the causes of my pain or about my subconscious motives of uttering the sentence ‘I am in pain.’ Regarding a person who is dreaming, the theory may demand that she be self-aware of her dreaming awareness, but certainly not that she knows that she is dreaming (cf. Ryle, 1949, pp. 158, 162). One can be visually aware of a speckled hen-appearance without knowing the number of the speckles, for the knowledge of the number -- a knowing-that, indeed -- requires a conceptual awareness about the number whereas the visual awareness may be nonconceptual. Similarly, one can be self-aware of the awareness bearing the appearance without knowing any fact about the awareness if this requires a knowing-that. The awareness is known in its specific concrete simplicity, not in any describable qualifier-qualificand or propositional structure.<sup>ix</sup> Of course, one can further conceptualize the awareness and verbalize it as, say, ‘I see a speckled hen.’ But on the Buddhist view conceptualization brings with it the probability of error and so one can definitely doubt the deliverances of conceptual awareness. There is no such thing as a

mistaken-proof conceptual determination of one's private mental states. Thus, the oft-raised objection to the effect that self-awareness is not infallible loses much of its force when directed against the Buddhist notion of self-awareness.

Since an intentional awareness as a particular is intrinsically ineffable, there is here no room for private language. There are no private words that one can resort to for expressing her subjective feel, for according to the Buddhist the elements of language are conventional in meaning and are thereby public. Besides, anyone who wants to place the Buddhist in the camp of Cartesian dualism would be amazed to find views to the contrary. While holding that pleasure as an awareness is immediately known in self-awareness, Dharmakīrti (PV III 448-454) makes the bold claim that my subsequent reflective awareness of my own pleasure is hardly any more authoritative than your awareness of it. At the nonconceptual level, my pleasure is self-known in its true nature, but the pleasure is ineffable. On the conceptual plane where my reflected pleasure is describable in words, I do not know it way better than you do. Either way, there is nothing inside my mind that I and only I can know truly *and* express properly. We can then leave behind any talk about private language.

With all that has been said, it should now be clear that the term 'introspection' is a misnomer for this notion of self-awareness if it means a chiefly attentive conceptual inward-inspecting awareness. Here, self-awareness does not involve any higher-order belief or thought that one is in some lower-order mental state. Self-awareness is not even a distinctive objectifying awareness that takes an intentional awareness as its object. Given Dignāga's 'triune' notion of consciousness it may seem for him the self-awareness aspect takes as its distinctive objects the two appearances, being the subjective and objectual aspects. If so, one wonders whether we need to posit yet another aspect called, say, the aspect of awareness of self-awareness to know the self-awareness aspect, and so on ad infinitum. One post-Dignāgean Yogācāra thinker named Dharmapāla did posit such an aspect. But this is somewhat an abnormal move. Dignāga might rather take the self-awareness aspect to be self-aware and thus do away with the threat of infinite regress.<sup>x</sup> As above noted, self-awareness is non-intentional; besides, an intentional awareness is given precisely as an awareness, not as an object. Properly speaking, the distinction between the three aspects is more nominal or notional than substantial. And Dharmakīrti (PV III 506) denies that self-awareness is an inner perception distinct from some co-arising intentional awareness. On the whole, for the Buddhist consciousness has no substantial distinctions in itself and is broadly self-reflexive.

It goes without saying that self-awareness is not a reflection or retrospection, which is

patently conceptual and subsequent to what one reflects on. We are concurrently aware of our mental states right as they occur and prior to any reflection on them. In this sense sense-awareness is here said to be pre-reflective. Even when we reflect on some mental episode, we are pre-reflectively aware of the reflection itself. The same awareness is *reflective* in relation to its object and *non-reflective* in relation to itself.

On the self-intimation view described by Ryle (1949, pp. 158-161), consciousness is the self-luminous property of one's mental states or the 'light' given off by the states. This notion of consciousness greatly differs from the Buddhist's. Further, the self-intimating states are 'looked at' or scrutinized by the mind. This point and also Ryle's (pp. 162-163) last few criticisms of the view suggest that the view is not much different from the introspection approach. In both cases one's mental occurrences are conceptually objectified and discerned for the infallible knowing that one is doing so and so.

Insofar as I can see, the Buddhist notion of self-awareness instead comes close to the notion of pre-reflective self-awareness attributed by Dan Zahavi to continental phenomenologists like Edmund Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Michel Henry. For brevity's sake I shall just attend to Zahavi, who, in cooperation with Josef Parnas, thus summarizes the phenomenological notion of self-awareness:<sup>xi</sup>

Consciousness is self-luminous. It is characterized by intentionality, but being intentionally aware of objects, it is simultaneously self-aware through and in itself. Its self-awareness is not due to a secondary act or reflex but is a constitutive moment of the experience itself, and consciousness can consequently be compared to a flame, which illuminates other things, and itself as well ...

Here self-awareness is not an explicit or thematic form of self-consciousness; it is not the result of consciousness directing its *gaze* at itself, taking itself as the object. It is pre-reflective in the sense that at the moment of my living through an experience, say, hearing a melody, thinking of a faraway city, or feeling sad or happy, I am instantly, tacitly, pre-conceptually aware of the experience itself. And, any explicit or reflective awareness of the experience rests upon such a prior tacit self-awareness, which is an internal feature of the experience and which does not itself give us conceptual knowledge of subjectivity (Zahavi, 2003, pp. 161-162, 168).

The flame simile, interestingly, reminds us of the lamp or light simile Buddhist thinkers so often appeal to. For example, Dharmakīrti writes as follows:

Just as the light, in illuminating a thing, is considered as illuminating its own form owing to its nature of illumination, likewise, an awareness is aware of itself. (PV III 329)

We do not regard a distinctive awareness as manifested [as it truly is] by its succeeding awareness even if they are similar. For, while an object becomes manifest by dint of its form [in an awareness, the awareness] manifests itself by itself. This is like the case of two lamps and that of one lamp and one jar. On the basis of the fact [that a jar is illumined by a lamp but not a lamp by another lamp], there is this usage of distinguishing between the *illuminator* and the *illuminatee*. (PV III 481-482)

Consciousness as an illuminator illuminates itself as well as its objects and this seems dictated by its very nature of illumination. There is no need for another illuminator. Of course, a knife cannot cut itself, a finger cannot point at itself, and eyes cannot see themselves. But consciousness is no such insentient thing. If we are to have a *robust* notion of consciousness, we may need to concur that the sentient nature of consciousness is such that it is aware of itself as well as its objects.

However, there are notable differences between the Buddhist view and the phenomenological view propounded by Zahavi. The phenomenological view predicates that an experience is characterized by a first-personal givenness in that it is, at least tacitly, given to me as *my* experience. To be thus *self*-aware is not to apprehend a substantial self apart from the experience, but to be acquainted with the experience in its first-personal mode of givenness, with the self being the invariant dimension of this givenness in the multitude of my experiences. Hence, in undergoing an experience I am aware of its object, the experience itself, and also its being my experience occurring in my stream of consciousness (Zahavi & Parnas, 1998, pp. 690-692). The Buddhist, as is well known, rejects any notion of an unchanging substantial self. The Yogācārin readily admits that one is always tacitly conscious of something one takes to be one's self, but considers this self-sense deeply delusive. The Buddhist epistemologist does not refer to the notion of self in his description of consciousness. The phenomenological notion of self would for him still be conventional or habitual. In its deep-lying nature consciousness is anonymous and pre-subjective, prior to the subject-object duality. And the core of consciousness belongs to self-awareness, not to the subjective and objectual aspects. This viewpoint may not be as unpersuasive as it might seem: at the most freshly arising moments of our sense experience we are not aware of a subject or self as such.



A given experience does not really belong to me; rather, I belong to it! It is on the basis of the experience that I construe it as something occurring in me. Of course, I have a strong disposition to take the experience as *my* experience, yet this is on the Buddhist view due to the conditioning of certain habitual traces coming from my ego-centered practices in past lives. Now, when I verbalize my consciousness as ‘I see a squirrel there,’ the phrase ‘I see’ at most expresses, almost metaphorically, its subjective aspect, while its core belongs to self-awareness, which is neither a subject nor an object. With the subjective aspect, there should be no puzzle of identifying in whose stream of consciousness an intentional awareness occurs; and we can continue to refer conventionally to an experience as *my* experience. This whole view has its ontological and soteriological relevance, which need not concern us here.

It is said before that the Buddhist self-awareness is mostly tacit or non-attentive. This would mean that the self-awareness is in some cases explicit or attentive. Dignāga on the idealist line speaks of self-awareness as the result of veridical perception, whereas Dharmakīrti does the same even from the non-idealist perspective. If so, do we not have a self-awareness which is explicit? This is indeed the case, which may signify another difference from the phenomenological view. It should be noted, however, that they are referring to nonconceptual perception rather than our ordinary conceptual awareness in daily life. When the existence of an external world is denied, one may nonconceptually know one’s own consciousness but certainly not some external object. Even when the world is posited, one, in perceiving an external object, is nonconceptually aware only of one’s sense awareness, especially the objectual appearance. And so self-awareness is here the result for Dharmakīrti, because it is the inner nature of sense perception, while the perception is the outer form of self-awareness.<sup>xii</sup> Still, self-awareness is tacit in our concept-tinged experience of the world. In waking life we are pre-reflectively and nonconceptually aware of our consciousness as well as our body. We, to borrow phrases from Michael Polanyi, tacitly integrate the contents of such awarenesses to attend to the world around us, and here we certainly know more than we can tell. In any case, we need to examine the arguments set forth by the Buddhist in support of the existence of self-awareness.

## V

The above discussions show that the Buddhist epistemologist subscribed himself to the self-awareness thesis that our consciousness is always pre-reflectively and nonconceptually aware of itself. Both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti gave arguments in favor of the thesis, and I shall explicate some of their arguments here. There is, first of all, the ‘memory argument’ articulated by Dignāga, which may be rephrased as follows (Hattori, 1968, p. 30):

- D1: Some time after one has seen a blue object, one can remember both the seeing and its object.
- D2: One cannot remember what has not been experienced before. For instance, if a person has no prior experience of a daffodil, she is unable to remember it.
- D3: The remembrance of the seeing is not due to its being experienced by a succeeding reflective cognition, for that would lead to an infinite regress, given that the cognition can also be remembered.
- D4: Therefore, at the time of seeing a blue object one must concurrently be aware of the seeing and its (intentional) object.

The premise D3 in the argument is leveled against thinkers of the Hindu Nyāya school, who, repudiating the Buddhist notion of self-awareness, maintain that a sense awareness is contingently cognized by a subsequent reflection or apperception. However, it is not hard for Nyāya to respond to the charge of infinite regress, and this issue has been dealt with by contemporary scholars.<sup>xiii</sup> Indeed, one can also find fault with D1. The Buddhist agrees that different sense awareness-acts look similar to their bearer, and he may admit that an awareness-act, i.e. the subjective aspect of consciousness, seems diaphanous or transparent to its bearer. If so, how can one be certain that one really remembers one's past act of seeing a blue object? I can remember with certainty that I saw yesterday a group of visitors outside a wooden cottage near my house, but not that they were 12 in number if I didn't count them. Likewise, I am not certain whether I genuinely recall, and not imagine or infer, my past act of seeing the visitors if the act was not then conceptually reflected. Since the argument denies that the remembrance of the act is due to subsequent reflection, there is no certainty regarding the remembrance. As a result the premise D1 loses much of its appeal. With flawed premises in D1 and D3, the memory argument is anything but convincing.

One way of showing the plausibility of the Buddhist thesis is by showing the implausibility of other alternatives. There are, for instance, other reasons the Buddhist cites against Nyāya. At the moment when the succeeding reflection arises, as Dharmakīrti (PV III 426) points out, the preceding awareness just vanished and so could not really be grasped by the reflection. This point presupposes the Buddhist theory of momentariness and may not be acceptable to many. A more cogent reason given by Dharmakīrti (PV III 427) can be put in this argumentative form:

- E1: A physical object apprehended by an awareness-act appears outwardly as something objective, while the awareness-act appears reflexively subjective.
- E2: When the awareness-act is apprehended by a reflective cognition, it as an object also appears as something objective.
- E3: The reflection, then, fails to apprehend the awareness-act in its true form of subjectivity.
- E4: Therefore, an awareness cannot really be apprehended by a reflective cognition.

The gist of the argument is that only pre-reflective self-awareness knows an intentional awareness in its real nature, for it alone experiences the awareness-act in its true form of subjectivity; any experience to the contrary is unacceptable. This argument seems to me persuasive. However, it only reveals the limitations of the reflection approach and in no way confirms the existence of self-awareness.

Another alternative to the self-awareness view is the approach based upon inference. Here some may contend that when an external object is perceived, the object externally appears and becomes a *known* object, assuming an attribute of *knownness*, and that by dint of such an attribute the perceiver infers that the object was being known by a perceptual awareness. Dharmakīrti's key criticism of this approach may thus be reconstructed (PV III 463-467):

- F1: On being perceived, an external object becomes a known object and may assume the state of being known.
- F2: An object cannot become a *known* object without the knower's being concurrently aware of the *knowing* awareness itself.
- F3: Therefore, at the time of perceiving an external object, the perceiver must be concurrently aware of the perceiving awareness itself.

That is, an awareness of an object's being known factually implies that of the knowing act. How, after all, can a perceiver know something to be a *perceived* object, if it were not for her self-awareness of the *perception*? We are back to the self-awareness view. And the Buddhist may agree with the phenomenologist that one can set to reflect upon an awareness only because one is already pre-reflectively aware of the awareness, which self-awareness functions to motivate the reflection.<sup>xiv</sup> Nevertheless, the argument does not sound overly convincing. It is one thing that the notion of being known conceptually implies that of knowing, quite another that an awareness of the known as such actually demands an

awareness of the knowing. If so, from the fact that an external object perceptually appears to a perceiver it does not necessarily follow that the perceiver is self-aware of her perceiving act.

Is the self-awareness thesis advocated by the Buddhist justified? Perhaps the Buddhist needs to back up the thesis with further reasons and arguments. But other approaches may not fare better, either. For most of us, just the visual appearance of a forest would instantly count as seeing a forest. We are disposed to go on this way. Self-awareness, inner perception, reflection, inference, none of these alternatives, it seems, fittingly accounts for our way of conscious life and so none of them looks particularly satisfactory. The Buddhist position would have an edge over the others if the appearance can persuasively be shown to be intentionally immanent in consciousness. However, Dharmakīrti's view in this connection remains problematic, for it, as noted above, partially hinges upon the existence of self-awareness, which is far from proven.

## VI

This essay is proposed as an enquiry into the Buddhist epistemologist theory of self-awareness to see its peculiarity and plausibility. For this purpose I first gave an outline of the Buddhist notion of consciousness, then dealt with the notion of objectual appearance, and finally dwelled upon the theory itself together with certain arguments in its favor. The overall discussion shows that the two Buddhist philosophers, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, subscribed themselves to the thesis that our consciousness is always pre-reflectively and nonconceptually aware of itself. I have also attempted to clarify important differences between the theory and the correspondent Cartesian views.

The Buddhist puts forth arguments in support of the self-awareness thesis, yet they are in no way conclusive. It is indeed hard to offer a convincing argument. While it is a sign of philosophic acumen to set forth a good argument, one ancient Indian philosopher was not unwise in noting that a given argument can always be countered by another argument. On the other hand, resorting to one's own experience may not help much here. Self-awareness being more elusive and diaphanous than body-awareness, when the question concerning its existence is asked, some would say *yes* while others *no*, each depending on her *own* experience. This is the case even when its nature has been properly comprehended.

The Buddhist theory of appearance is intriguing, perhaps even tenable, but it apparently runs against common people's pre-theoretical intuition. The Buddhist conception of consciousness is connected with Yogācāra idealism, yet idealism is overly unappealing to our present-day mentality. This, plainly, does not mean that his theory of self-awareness is something of an antique, of interest only to Indological or philosophical antiquarians. The

theory, with its stress on the nonconceptual and mostly tacit nature of self-awareness, is definitely more persuasive than the Cartesian and British empiricist views of introspection and self-intimation, which have few adherents today. And its deeply pre-subjective or pre-personal implications may better reflect the anonymous immediacy of experience than the phenomenological alternative. However, if the subjective aspect of sense experience seems transparent, if just the visual appearance of a squirrel would count as seeing a squirrel, then, the theory should be taken only with a pinch of salt. In any case, I hope to have shown that the Buddhist epistemological theory of self-awareness is contemporarily relevant and constitutes at least a viable option for our philosophizing on the issue of self-consciousness.

## Notes

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<sup>i</sup> For a fine survey of the historical development of the notion of self-awareness in Indian Buddhism, see Yao (2005).

<sup>ii</sup> This view is first set forth in the first chapter of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (henceforth PS I); see Hattori (1968, pp. 29, 107).

<sup>iii</sup> See the third chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (henceforth PV III), verses 318-9, 326, 356, 438-440, 508 (I follow the verse numbering of Tosaki's *Bukkyo-nishikiron no kenkyū*). Some later Buddhists go further to bypass Dignāga's 'triune' notion of consciousness and stress the self-illumination nature of consciousness. Incidentally, Dharmakīrti also construes the notion of self-awareness to mean the apprehension of the objectual appearance by the awareness-act (cf. PV III 348-349, 425, 442), but this construal would not be our main focus.

<sup>iv</sup> For instance, Ganeri (1999), Chakrabarti (2003), Perrett (2003) and Yao (2005); however, I have benefited from their writings. Incidentally, I shall not here cite the relevant passages from works by Descartes or Locke as they can be found in Ganeri (1999) and Perrett (2003).

<sup>v</sup> I prefer the term 'knowing' to 'knowledge' because the classical Indian epistemological notion of knowledge (*pramā*) is episodic and current rather than dispositional. See Perrett (2003, p. 234). An inferential knowing (or knowledge-episode) only occurs at the end of a valid inferential process; the knowing of the self-awareness type, by contrast, is ever current.

<sup>vi</sup> For the notion of fact-awareness, see Dretske (1993, pp. 264-269). Dretske contrasts fact-awareness with thing-awareness and construes the former as implying a deployment of some concept in the sense that if a person is (fact-)aware that  $x$  is  $F$ , then she has the concept  $F$  and uses it in her awareness of  $x$ . If a fact-awareness is veridical, it can adequately be said to be a knowing-that.

<sup>vii</sup> I got the idea from Michael Dummett's (1993, p. 126) notion of knowledge-what; how Dummett construes the notion, however, is irrelevant to the present discussion. In PV III 177 Dharmakīrti says to the effect that one nonconceptually experiences an awareness as a *what* (*kim*).

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- <sup>viii</sup> See Nagel (1974). Nagel would subscribe himself to a form of self-awareness if he holds that in undergoing an experience the person is simultaneously enjoying a somewhat indescribable subjective *feel*.
- <sup>ix</sup> Likewise, although I am tacitly aware of my body, the felt content of my bodily awareness is not in a propositional form describable, for example, as ‘my body is walking.’
- <sup>x</sup> The problem with this view is that one may reasonably ask why such kind of self-awareness should be reserved for the self-awareness aspect, and not already be a feature of the intentional awareness itself. Cf. Zahavi (2003, p. 166).
- <sup>xi</sup> Zahavi & Parnas (1998, p. 696). Matthew D. MacKenzie (2007) is one rare article that stresses the broad semblance between the Buddhist view and the phenomenological (mainly Sartre’s) notion.
- <sup>xii</sup> PV III 348-350. We recall that Dharmakīrti also takes self-awareness to be an awareness-act’s apprehension of the objectual appearance.
- <sup>xiii</sup> For this issue as well as problems concerning D1, refer to Matilal (1986, pp. 153, 157-159), Ganeri (1999, p. 482) and Perrett (2003, pp. 232-234).
- <sup>xiv</sup> Mohanty (1992, p. 50) thus comments: ‘Reflection analyses what was originally given.’ See Zahavi & Parnas (1998, pp. 696-697) and Zahavi (2003, p. 163).

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## 赴國外研究心得報告

計畫編號	NSC 95—2411—H—343—001
計畫名稱	量物致知---法稱知識論與邏輯之研究
出國人員姓名 服務機關及職稱	何建興；南華大學宗教學研究所副教授
出國時間地點	2007年2月3-14日；日本京都、東京、茨城
國外研究機構	京都大學人文科學研究所、筑波大學哲學所

### 工作記要：

本計畫因梵文文本解讀及問題討論等需要，申請於計畫執行第二年，前往日本，就法稱知識論與邏輯相關議題，直接與相關學者討論請益。計畫執行人先寫信予特定日本學者，提及拜訪事宜，不過，部分學者並未回信，以致未能見到原先擬欲拜訪的學者。依個人後來所知，二月份對很多日本大學教授而言，正是相當忙碌的月份，或許選在此時前往日本，其時機並不太恰當。

個人於2月3日由桃園國際機場出發，當日晚上抵日本大阪，隔日前往京都。於京都主要是拜會京都大學人文科學研究所的船山徹教授。船山是日本中生代研究佛教知識論的佼佼者，曾來台於中華佛學研究所講學。他專精法稱以及寂護、蓮華戒等人的量論思想，個人特別就本計畫所涉及的法稱知識論部分與其討論，議題包括：法稱對「自證知」概念的理解及其與陳那觀點的可能差異，法稱《釋量論》裡作為能緣相的pariccheda概念的概念分別性，法稱對無分別感官知覺的理解，日本學者久間泰賢對自相知覺的理解，以及John Dunne近著Foundations of Dharmakirti's Philosophy對知覺對象之多數性的觀點等。對於這些問題，船山教授都能提出其看法，讓個人受益匪淺。就法稱對「自證知」概念的理解而言，他認為法稱的確也將「自證知」理解為能緣相緣取所緣相，亦即見分緣取相分，但他認為，陳那對此問題的論述篇幅有限，很難說陳那一定無相似見解。對於Dunne以知覺對象為多數極微的觀點，船山教授表示反對意見，認為對法稱而言，感官知覺對象總是處於聚集狀態下的諸極微，而這仍具有某種一元性，不能直以之為純然多數的。個人也就部分梵文偈頌理解問題，就教於他。

此外，也與船山徹討論其他量論相關議題，包括日本佛學界量論研究現況，有關護法《觀所緣論釋》提及「法稱」一詞的意義，中國大陸學者姚治華的論文等。個人也就他有關「有相唯識」與「無相唯識」的一篇論文，提出問題同他討論。他也與計畫執行人簡短討論執行人最近發表於Philosophy East and West的一篇論文。依他告知，Ernst Steinkellner所重構的陳那《集量論·現量品》梵文文本，可於某網站上取得，這對個人來說是很有價值的資訊。原本擬拜訪京都大學印度古典學研究室的赤松明彥教授，但因Email聯繫出問題，加上赤松教授



休假等因素而未能會面，頗為可惜。不過，經船山教授介紹，也在京都也與京大畢業的年輕學者赤羽律一談，他研究智藏等後期中觀學，我們討論了智藏與佛教量論的關係，以及中觀學者清辨對於勝義諦的特殊理解。

原本擬於東京會見早稻田大學哲學系的岩田孝教授，以及東京學藝大學人文社會科學系的稻見正浩教授。但是，前者一直未能回信，想直接去早稻田大學登門拜訪，只是去的當天正好遇上該校入學考試，因交通管制而無法進入。至於稻見教授則來信告知，他那幾天因學校行政事務繁忙，無法抽空與個人長談。稻見氏研究佛教邏輯，最近有篇文章討論佛教量論與唯心論的關係，未來有機會再向他請益。個人2月7-8日停留東京期間，主要蒐集或購買與本計畫研究相關的書籍資料。此中，先前往東京府中市的東京外國語大學，擬購買Keyword In Context Index to Jinendrabuddhi's *Visalamalavati Pramanasamuccayatika* Chapter I一書，後來，該校出版單位直接送我一本。另外，也前往東京大學附近的書店街，順利地購買了矢板秀臣編著《佛教知識論的原典研究》（成田山新勝寺，2005年）等書。特別是矢板的書，收有《瑜伽師地論》等書的介紹與梵文本，以及他本人的量論相關英文論文與翻譯，對於法稱量論的研究當有不少助益。

計畫執行人於2月12日前往東京附近茨城縣的筑波大學，訪問小野基等佛教學者。小野教授專研佛教邏輯，也是日本中生代傑出的佛教學者。由於他父親於日據時代曾於台灣工作，因此他對筆者來訪格外好客，與其學生驅車至筑波火車站接我，再一起前往其研究室。個人與小野教授的討論，以佛教邏輯為主。我認為，法稱邏輯表面上雖然解決了陳那邏輯的一些內在問題，而較接近西方意義的演繹邏輯，但相對地，純粹的演繹邏輯並無法提供我人新的知識，這卻同量論的基本精神相違背。事實上，法稱及其注釋家同意說，基於自性因以及不可得因的論證主要是為了曉喻童愚，但這對其他人而言卻很難引生新的知識。對此，小野氏認為，法稱的相關邏輯推論並非是演繹式的，充其量只能說是dogmatic，即使在為自比量處，仍可用以確認推論者個人的信念；無論如何，法稱目的在於解決陳那邏輯的某些問題。此外，也請教小野教授對於法稱與陳那邏輯的理論差異的看法。他認為，陳那不以「不共不定因」為正因，也因此並不完全接受同喻與異喻間的邏輯等值性。相對地，法稱主張anvaya與vyatireka之間的等值性，這使得他必須重新解釋「不共不定因」。另外，也討論法稱《正理滴論》裡的yogya字的涵義；小野氏認為，法上的解釋與律天不同，後者較素樸，前者則有突破性意涵，可與Noam Chomsky的某些語言觀點相較。這些問題的討論較複雜，我們也談及日本的量論研究現況以及研究量論所應具備的條件。小野基教授的英語發音低渾不清晰，個人時有困難理解他的意思。不過，訪問當天也與他的幾個研究生交談，她們多半研究較後期的量論以及唯識與中觀學。

個人在筑波大學也會見該校畢業的年輕學者渡邊俊和。渡邊氏研究法稱邏輯，目前正協助龍谷大學的桂紹隆教授，編輯新進出土的Jinendrabuddhi《集量論》〈為他比量品〉梵本注釋。該書預定於明年年底出版，對於陳那邏輯的研究應有很大貢獻，不過，他也表示，重構陳那〈為他比量品〉原文仍有很大困難，不少段落仍僅屬臆測性質。個人也與渡邊氏討論法稱的邏輯理論，特別是有關法稱對「相違決定因」的理解。基於法稱對「因三相」的新理解，他也將此因排除於一般的比量推論之外，以此因僅適用於特殊的宗教與哲學論述。這回應解除筆者先前對此議題的疑惑。渡邊氏與小野基教授也送我他們的著書或論文，也是此行的一

個收穫。

此次赴日本短期訪問，由於時機與事先聯絡等問題，未能與較多日本學者會面，是需要改善處。儘管如此，此次日本行仍有很大的收穫，諸如跟幾位傑出的量論學者討論法稱的知識論與邏輯議題，解除個人先前有關文本理解及特定議題的某些困惑。另外，也購得或取得不少研究相關的圖書與論文，對本計畫的順利執行頗有幫助。日本量論學者一般都有良好的語言文獻學訓練，也有一定程度的哲學訓練，他們較不喜歡作哲學性的探討與發揮，此或為其短，但相對地，其研究多半相當扎實，值得我人學習與重視。另一方面，本以為在日本，佛學研究者應有較好的出路，但似乎不是這樣。不少研究學者本身是僧侶，有所屬寺院的經濟支援，至於其他在家研究者，在取得博士學位後，即使研究能力強，仍常無法順利於大學專任，面臨生活上的壓力。如先前提及的赤羽律博士，雖相當優秀，但目前也只能於大學及學院裡兼課。以此看來，人文學科研究的不受重視，恐怕是國際間相當普遍的學術與教育現象。