基於股權分離假說，在一般觀念中，公開發行公司之股權必定相當分散，但實際並非如此。股東擁有公司股票時，其股票中包含兩種權利，一為公司之所有權，即其股權；另一為公司之控制權，即為投票權，可用以參與公司經營決策與經營型態的決定。公司主要股東即使不存在股權集中的情形，但仍可能利用交叉持股、金字塔結構等機制，增加對公司控制的權力。在實際控制權偏離其股權的情況下，將可能因利益無法與公司一致而引發負向侵占效果，進而傷害公司價值。此外，公司的整體經營型態，亦會使股東行為形成影響公司價值的原因，本文根據Shapley 值(SV值) 的概念並考慮交叉持股等機制，以2006年台灣地區上市公司排除金融類股，研究樣本共624家公司，並利用Shapley值衡量主要股東對公司實際控制權的掌握程度，並以迴歸分析來解釋控制權與公司價值的非線性關係，及探討主要股東控制權對公司價值的影響。實證結果顯示，當SV值高於特定值，表示主要股東控制程度達一定水準，則將引發主要股東的正向誘因效果，提昇公司價值；反之，將可能引發主要股東的負向侵占效果，傷害公司價值。 According to Berle and Means (1932), ownership dispersion hypothesis interprets the separation of ownership and control. However, it's not always true for public-listed companies in reality. The control of dominant shareholder is enhanced via pyramid and cross-holdings among firms even when there's no concentrated ownership. While voting rights exceed cash-flow rights, the negative entrenchment effect is induced, thereby reducing the corporation valuation. We apply the concept of Shapley Value by Guedes and Loureiro (2006) on the non-financial companies publicly listed in Taiwan during the period of 2006. Our sample consists of 624 firms and we measure the degree of corporate control by the largest shareholder using the Shapley Value. We apply a threshold model to estimate the non-linear relationship of control right and corporate valuation, and investigate the impact of dominant shareholders control right to corporate valuation. The empirical evidence indicates that the main shareholder is induced when the Shapley Value is above the estimated threshold.
