近年來台灣金融機構頻傳弊案及逾放比過高的問題，顯示出金融機構經營不善，績效不佳的情形。本論文以2002年42家台灣地區銀行之年度財報為研究資料，運用因素分析、CAMELS指標及Logistic迴歸分析，探討台灣地區銀行業的治理機制與經營績效，以及兩者之關聯性。實證結果如下： 1.因大幅提列呆帳準備與放款衰退之原因，我國銀行2002年之經營績效表現不佳。但打消呆帳有助於銀行體質之改善，對往後之經營績效有正面之效應。 2.加入金控集團，對銀行之經營績效有弱性之正面作用，但對於公司治理機制的改善，並無顯著之效益。 3.最大股東利用間接持有之方式獲得持股，造成控制權與現金流量權偏離，由於控制權高於現金流量權，表示最大股東對於銀行盈虧分享程度低於其所投入之成本；在這種情形下，最大股東有較大的誘因進行圖利自身不利銀行的行為，例如關係人不當貸款。並因此造成銀行的損失，降低銀行經營績效。 4.將最大股東持股比率的影響區分為正面效果與負面效果而言，台灣銀行業之負面效果大於正面效果，而落實公司治理機制有助於降低負面效果，提升經營績效。 The frequent fraud cases and high non-performing loan ratio of Taiwan’s banking industry indicate that there exists a problem of imperfect operating performance. The purpose of this research is then to examine the relationship between corporate governance and operating performance of Taiwan’s bank industry. The study takes 42 banks of Taiwan as samples and with the data of 2002. The research methods we manipulate cover factor analysis, CAMELS and logistic regression analysis. The conclusions are as follows: 1.In general, the operating performance of Taiwan’s banking industry is not good enough as all return ratios are negative. 2.The way that the ultimate shareholders hold there shares indirectly causes that the control right will deviate from the cash flow right. Therefore the degree that the ultimate shareholders share profit and loss of corporate will lower than their investment costs and make them to have a higher motive to adopt unfavorable actions against the bank. 3.As the ultimate shareholders could probably manipulate their control right to control the board of directors and policy as well, the situations of improper loans could happen frequently. 4.The holding ratio of ultimate shareholders has both positive and negative effects. However, the negative effect has higher influence then positive effect and this implies that the banks should reinforce the control mechanism to reduce the negative effect and then improve the operating performance.
