在計劃之第一年,筆者以《孟子》中所引〈文王〉〈太甲〉之「禍福自取」,以及孔子之「清濁自取」之說,論證倫理上責任自我之概念。在計劃之第二年中,筆者即以此責任自我為基礎,藉《詩經》等揭示孟子本心概念之意涵-道德能力以及其道德純粹意向之主體性。此兩項內涵皆是人之倫理責任之可能性條件:人之所以能承擔倫理責任,乃必須有充足能力於倫理(由本心所證成),亦須在規範之普遍性下(此由本心之意向性證成),而可能。在人之道德能力問題上,孟子把《詩經》之心緒概念純化到其善性之主體,並以兩個方式展現其意向性,其一:心之悅愉理義,其二:心之期待聖人(象徵道德圓滿者)。關於前者,孟子藉〈蒸民〉詩把傳統上理解為不確定的「好」,詮釋為定然的好-悅愉理義,筆者藉由〈文王有聲〉,即可詮釋為心悅誠服於理義。關於後者,孟子以審美經驗之普遍共同感覺反駁告子「食色性也」之私人內感說,從而說明期待之純粹意向性,進而證成:倫理上規範之普遍性乃奠基在期待道德圓滿者(聖人)之純粹意向上。其理由無它,因為人之改過遷善乃在於人能期待道德圓滿者,但此又在人必須把自己看成為與聖人同類之人性平等上,否則這圓滿者之聖人概念也根本不可能也。 In my first year project, I would like to justify the concept of the ego of an ethical responsibility by means of〈 King Wen 文王〉and〈 Taijia 太甲〉cited in 《Mencius》. 〈King Wen〉 and〈 Taijia〉 show that happiness and disaster are caused by nobody but the actor himself, and Confucius hold that purity and turbidity of water was caused also by human himself. In the second year I would like to reveal the meanings of the concept of the original mind on the base of such ego of the responsibility 一 the moral ability and his moral pure intentionality which are the conditions of the possibility for ethical responsibility, that is, it is necessary for us to have enough ability (justified through the concept of the original mind) and to stand under the universal norm (justified through the intentionality of the original mind) in order to think that we can be ethical responsible. In respect of the problem of the original mind as a moral ability Mencius attempted to develop the concept of mood in 《Shijing 詩經》purely to a subject whose nature is good and shows his intentionality in two ways of the pleasure to moral norms and of the expectance to sage. On the problem of pleasure Mencius developed from the concept of inclination with uncertainty through the understanding of 〈 Zhengmin 烝民〉to the concept of pleasure to moral laws with certainty, and therefore I can explain such pleasure through〈 King Wen with Sound 文王有聲〉as an obedience to the moral laws without conflict. On the problem of intentionality Mencius refuted the theory of private inner feelings in the debate of identification of the human nature with eating and seeing of Gaozi(告子)by the universal common sense in an aesthetic experience in order to explain the pure intentionality of an expectance, that is, to justify that the universality of norms was based on the pure intentionality of an expectance to the moral perfection like sage. The reasons for it are followings: the possibility of an ethical collection depends on the possibility of the expectance to sage, but such possibility depends on again that we must see ourselves as equal to sage, otherwise the concept of the moral perfect of sage is essentially impossible.