| 摘要: | 本研究之主要工作，乃證成陽明倫理學理解中之道德全體之概念，此奠基在對良知本體工夫之說明上；而所謂存有學研究，乃是揭示使這全體概念可能之先行性條件，即是，本體工夫。因而，這工夫概念，不是泛泛地落在本體上即宣稱被證成，而是透過它能對道德全體概念進行說明，而成為一在倫理學上可被確信的概念。為完成這一任務，透過與康德方法論與道德全體性概念進行對比，乃是必要的，因為當它能解決康德方法論所隱含的困難，也即消解把法則判斷與情感動機分離之困難，而且亦可解決靈魂不滅在論證道德全體之無力，則更能突顯其良知概念及其工夫在相關說明之重要性。這一切皆歸功對良知與其知行合一概念之分析，它揭示出人之倫理價值之本源，也即規範之動機即在其知之中，而使一倫理規範之正當性，在知與行之連結必然性中，成為可理解。本體工夫之概念，即從這知行合一中分析而出，只是其問題不再是道德一般，而是其全體。在存有學理解中，此本體工夫並不是隨人私意而可斷了，不是依人要或不要而有無，乃總必被設想為持存無間，只在其中，作為規範之天理，才有可能，且所有倫理地評價的行為被連結在一起，而不是一孤立的生起事件，因而屬一超自覺層面之概念。假若此工夫乃可斷的，而良知被孤立成在不同時刻中，此乃暗示某人昨天之惡行，對今日之良知言，乃是一他者；然而，在這假設性的工夫間斷之孤立性中，此惡行卻不能被究責。因而，只能在這工夫不間斷之先行理解下，才能究責人之倫理沉淪；沉淪不是心理狀態，乃是一倫理上的批評，並必在本體之提撕工夫之先行理解中才能成立，因為，若非從提撕來理解，則沉淪之說，即從倫理地究責，變成漫罵。因而，不只良知呈現，而是不間斷地呈現，是全體倫理價值之可能性之最高條件。依此，本體工夫不能理解為心理學上之奮進，而是存有學的，否則即落入一技術概念中。
In this study I would like to justify the concept of the moral totality in Yangmin's ethical understanding, which depends upon the original effort based on our conscience; the so called ontological study in my paper means nothing but a philosophy work to reveal the condition for the possibility of such totality, that is, the original effort. The concept effort is thus not justified through a claim to combine the concept of substance, but through its ability to explain the concept totality of moral. It is necessary for the purpose of my paper to compare Kant's ethics with Yangmin's ethical effort, because the later can offer a solution for the difficulty implied in Kant's method, that is, a solution for the dualism based on a separation between judgment of moral law and intention of moral sense, and the solution for the inability of soul concerning the argument of the moral totality, in order to make the ability of the concept of conscience and its ethical effort visible. All what discussed thanks to an analysis of the concept of unity between knowing and acting, which explores the original of our moral value, that is, the knowing of a norm implies its intention, and therefore makes the legitimacy of a norm understandable because of the unity in conscience. In the ontological understanding Yangmin's effort can't be seen as something breakable, that is, the effort doesn't depend on human being's willing and stands up by himself without interruption, in which ethical norms become impossible and ethical evaluations can't be unified and become individual and incomprehensible, it belongs thus to a concept of transcendental consciousness. In supposing that the original effort may be thought as breakable and therefore isolated in differences, the isolation implies that the former evil is the other for later conscience and thus this evil can't be blamed by later, an ethical blame also can't be thought as understandable because the blamed is isolated from the conscience who intends to ask an ethical responsibility for him. The concept of original effort comes from the unity analytically, and intends not to moral in general, but in totality. Only under such understanding it can be even meaningful to say someone becoming bad, because such saying as a blame is possible only under a precondition of the ethical effort, that is, the saying can't be thought as an ethical critique and therefore only as a noisy without ethical meaning, when the precondition can't be presupposed. Not only the present, but also the unbreakable present of conscience is the highest condition for the possibility of ethical totality. Accordingly Yangmin's original effort can't be thought as something by a psychological concept depending on technique, but an effort by the ontological concept to explain an ability which makes the concept moral totality become possible. |
