本文從公共選擇理論為出發點，建構選民與官僚之行為模式，以經濟圖形之分析 方法，探討地價稅基與公共設施之政治景氣循環現象，並藉由臺灣省21個縣市自1987年至 1998年之實際情料，分析是否產生政治景氣循環現象，得出之結論為：苗栗縣、臺中縣、雲 林縣、花蓮縣、澎湖縣、基隆市、新竹市和臺中市等八個縣市產生地價稅基之政治景氣循環 現象；桃園縣、基隆市和嘉義市等三個縣市產生公共設施之政治景氣循環現象，當執政者為 個人之利租而操弄經濟工具時，為減少地價稅基與公共設施偏離社會最適化之現象，宜建立 完善之民主監督機制，使選民之資訊充分，以減緩政治景氣循環現象。 Based upon the public choice theory, a behavior model of voters and bureaucrat and a political analytic method were built in order to investigate the political business cycle of land value tax base and local public goods. The data collected from 1987 to 1998 of 21 hsiens and cities in Taiwan Province were analyzed. The result indicate that there were political business cycle of land value tax base in Miaoli Hsien, Taichung Hsien, Yunlin Hsien, Hwalien Hsien, Penghu Hsien, Keelung City, Hsinchu City and Taichung City. The analysis also shown there were political business cycle of local public goods in Taoyuan Hsien, Keelung City and Chiayi City. A perfect democratic supervised system should be established to prevent the incumbent politicians manipulate land value tax base and local public goods for their own ego rent. The voters can also be provided with enough information to minimize the political business cycle.
