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    題名: 論象山之二心為一及其倫理學問題
    其他題名: On Xiangshan'S Unity of Two Minds and Its Ethical Problems
    作者: 陳士誠
    貢獻者: 南華大學生死學系
    關鍵詞: 二心為一;人自我;一心二端;決意;可究責性
    unity of two minds;human ego;two beginnings of one mind;decision;responsibility
    日期: 2020
    上傳時間: 2021-01-25 14:48:30 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究乃處理象山二心為一之說,以揭示其倫理學意涵及其哲學史根源。 二心即是道心與人心;而所謂為一, 乃表二心間之統一。依唐君毅之詮釋,視之為同一心之或升或降即表此統一;其次乃依象山文本,筆者視之為二心統一其中的一自我概念,它表示人自我在道德意識中或順其本心之決意或違逆之決意,因而即是人自我之心意識中的兩端緒而已。合此,人自我若順本心為善即是其心之上升;反之,若違逆,則是同一心之下降。因而在這自我之概念下,不再如近代所理解般,把為惡之說明置於本心外無意識的他者之影響,遂使善與惡分離,表現為一無知至惡論,但此卻無從說明人之道德規範與究責之可能性。本心與人心之分別,乃是對其概念進行先驗分析而至者,以便能揭示本心概念之特質;但此本心概念並未涵蓋人道德意識之全體,而只這全體中的一部分,因這概念未蘊含犯惡之可能性,由是藉它並未能說明為犯惡者自身及對其惡之可能究責。而人自我所表者乃其心意識之兩端,才表道德意識之全體: 本心是我的本心,我亦是那犯惡者,由是,這自我乃是善惡之可能性之統一主體。以上之分析乃在象山所引用的孟子文本中所建立者,也即是,象山二心為一之說,不管其倫理學意涵抑或其哲學史根源,乃藉孟子學之連結中所達至者。
    In this research I would like to discuss Xiangshan's unity of two minds in order to explore its ethical implications and the roots of its philosophical history. The two minds mean Dao mind and human mind, and the so-called one mind is the unity of the two. And this unity in my paper is regarded as the one-mind's rise or fall by the interpretation of Tang Junyi, and as a concept of ego to combine two minds in according to Ziangshan's text, the unity is an ego who makes a decision for his original mind or against it, thus it is two beginnings of the same mind. In one word the mind rises when the ego's decision depends upon his original mind, on the contrary the same mind falls when his decision violates it, as a consequence, the understanding of evil would no longer depend upon an unconscious other outside his original mind like modern interpretation because of the concept of the ego. Such modern interpretation would cause a difficulty of agnosticism to evil and therefore a difficulty of separation of good and evil. Through the distinction between the two minds we can realize the essence of the concept of original mind by a transcendental analysis, but what we can get from such method is not the whole of the moral consciousness but only a part of it, because the concept of original mind implies not the possibility of evil and thus fails to explain the responsibility for his evil. The two beginnings of the human consciousness are the whole of moral consciousness, and the possibility of evil is contained in it. The original mind is mine, and I am also the ego to make his evil, thus the ego is nothing but the ultimate subject for the possibility of good and evil. The above analysis is based on the Mencius text quoted by Xiangshan. That is, Xiangshan's two minds in one, regardless of its ethical implications or its philosophical history, is dependent on the combination with Mencius.
    顯示於類別:[生死學系(生死學系碩士班,哲學與生命教育碩士班)] 國科會計畫

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