兩岸地方政府在經濟發展事務的表現，呈現出截然不同的發展！中國大陸的地方政府對經濟發展事務極為積極與主動，相形之下，台灣的地方政府對此卻是偏向消極與被動。過度的介入經濟活動，是中國大陸官場貪汙與經濟過熱的根源之一，而地方政府消極與被動，卻是台灣地方經濟低度發展、欠缺特色的根源。因此，本文擬從機制設計理論角度切入，解構兩岸地方政府何以在經濟發展上有如此不同的表現。本文研究發現，大陸地方政府的體制設計與運作，讓地方經濟發展與地方政府形成激勵相容，而在訊息透明化上，由於一黨專政體制下資訊容易操控，監督難以落實，兩相結合下，從而擴大了大陸地方政府對經濟發展事務充滿積極性。相對的，台灣由於制度設計上，經濟發展事務與地方政府、地方首長的自利無法形成激勵相容，配合上訊息透明化程度高，從而導致地方政府在經濟發展事務上著力有限，因此台灣的地方政府與執政者，在施政上偏向辦理社會福利及各式活動等，有利於建立從政者形象與爭取選票的短期作為！本文認為，兩岸地方政府固然在根本制度設計上都被賦予地方經濟發展的權限，但由於激勵相容與資訊透明化的程度歧異，從而導致兩岸地方政府在經濟發展事務上，出現非常明顯的對比與歧異。而機制設計理論中的激勵相容與資訊透明化兩大重點，本文認為，在未來兩岸地方政府進行職能改革與調整時，應該作為制度設計時的重要理論參考！ The local governments of Taiwan and Mainland China have the similar conditions of power in economic development, but their performances of local economic development are very different. The Mainland China's local governments show highly enthusiasm about economic development issues, so they involve in many economic activities and lead to serious corruption and economic overheating. On the contrary, Taiwan's local governments lean toward negative and passive about economic development issues, and it make local economy low developed and lack of local features. This paper attempts to employ mechanism design theory to analysis why the economic development performances of Taiwan's and Mainland China's local governments have such differences. This paper find the Mainland China's local government system afford the incentive compatible between local economic development and the future of local authorities. And, in the same time, the CPC (Communist Party of China) one-party rule system control all information, without information transparency, that supervision of local government can't really work. That's why the Mainland China's local governments show extremely enthusiasm about economic development issues. On the contrary, the Taiwan's local government system don’t afford the incentive compatible between local economic development and the future of local authorities, and the information transparency of local government is high enough that local authorities can't do what they want about economic development. So in Taiwan, the Local Government and local authorities prefer those policies that help building the image of them and win votes in the short-term! The differences of the incentive compatible and information transparency of the local government system between Taiwan and Mainland China decide the performance of economic development of local governments. If Mainland China want to change the local government's economic development role, and if Taiwan want to improve it, to change the incentive compatible and information transparency of their local government system are the key points.
