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無得與中道：吉藏三論思想及其與初期印度中觀學的比較哲學分析

Non-acquisition and Middle-way: A Philosophical Analysis of Jizang's Sanlun Thought in
Comparison to Early Indian Madhyamaka

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二、報告內容

前言

本計畫為二年期計畫，以中國佛教三論宗宗師吉藏的思想為主要研究對象，探究其語言思想、方法論、二諦論與中道論等，並以之與初期印度中觀學派思想參照，了解吉藏思想的特殊性及其與中印思想差異。本研究第一年就吉藏的語言思想，特別有關言語與沉默之關係，撰寫英文論文一篇，並比較吉藏與龍樹相關思想的異同關係。第二年則研究他和僧肇、龍樹之與無得與中道相關的存有論思想，並撰寫英文論文一篇。

研究目的

- 1) 探究吉藏思想中的語言思想、方法論、二諦論、中道論等，顯明其思想的現代意涵，為此國際學界乏人問津的領域做出學術貢獻。
- 2) 對初期印度中觀思想進行較全面的研究，除充實個人學識外，或可補充國際學者的龍樹研究的不足。
- 3) 探討吉藏與初期中觀思想的異同關係，顯示印度中觀學於六、七世紀中國的思想轉化及其可能原因。

文獻探討

國際學界於吉藏思想的研究成果相當貧乏。Richard Robinson 的 1967 年著作 *Early Mādhyamika in India and China*，論述羅什至僧肇的初期三論學統並有部分著作的英文翻譯。作者指出羅什漢譯的某些問題，此多少使得其後的漢地學者無法精確掌握原始中觀文本的文意。鄭學禮(Hsueh-li Cheng)的 *Empty Logic: Mādhyamika Buddhism from Chinese Sources*，依古代中文譯著討論印度中觀思想、中觀與禪宗的關係以及中觀學派對於哲學議題的處理方式，書中多處述及吉藏思想。作者也參照康德與維根斯坦(Wittgenstein)哲學，以解釋及對比中觀思想；此一操作在細節上有可議處，但也不無可觀。此中最重要的英文著作，當屬香港廖明活(Ming-wood Liu)教授的 *Madhyamaka Thought in China* 一書。本書先簡介印度中觀教學的形成，其次第二、三章分別論述僧肇與吉藏的中國中觀思想，第四章則論列天台宗與禪宗教法中的中觀精神。本書在討論印度中觀方面較簡略，作者的理解也受到中國中觀思想的影響。不過，作者是國際三論學的權威學者，此

書勾勒吉藏的「無執」教學主軸及其對「判教」、「二諦」與「佛性」等議題的見解，其論述饒有價值。另一方面，作者對於吉藏思想偏於強調「無得」與「教學」面向，未必合於此思想全貌；此外，其研究採文獻學與義理詮釋進路，未能深入抉發吉藏思想的哲學意涵，後者正是本研究的用心處。

中文學界有關吉藏三論思想的研究著述，為數偏少。廖明活教授的《嘉祥吉藏學說》是此中翹楚，其對吉藏思想的認識已相當通透，值得後學敬重。不過，他似不擅長哲學分析，在析理深微上仍嫌不足，也未能與當代思想比較，此是我人在其著作的基礎上可以強化者。此外，廖氏刻意淡化吉藏思想的形上色彩，強調所謂「中道」也「祇能是一化解偏執的作用」。國內學者楊惠南教授研究龍樹與吉藏思想有年，其《吉藏》一書也是中文學界的佳作；作者說理明晰，較之前書為長於哲學闡述。只是，作者論述偶有匆促結論之嫌，某些細部解說也有問題。

本計畫以吉藏思想的研究為主，其次則與初期中觀對比參照。國際學界的印度中觀學研究始自十九世紀下半葉的歐洲，迄今已然著作繁多，不少是熟悉西方哲學的研究者的成果，唯無法在此一一列舉。晚近約 20 年的學界研究中，若侷限於著重哲學探討者，學者如 C. W. Huntington 等人訴諸後維根斯坦的實用主義與解構哲學的洞見，以解釋龍樹與月稱的中觀思想。Huntington 強調恐懼與苦難的終止或相關解脫實踐對於中觀思想家的重要性，但他過於強調中觀學的反方法與反理性面向，以致最近為 Jay Garfield 所批評。Garfield 與 Mark Siderists 是晚近以分析哲學詮解龍樹哲學的兩大代表人物，尤其是 Siderists 更參酌英美流行的反實在論(anti-realism)，以事物的空性(emptiness)在於它們之依待我人的概念建構，而「一切法空」一說正在於否定形上學的實在論，否定任何獨立於我人概念網絡之外的世界。Garfield 與 Siderists 強調龍樹思想的理性主義色彩，而與 Huntington 正相對反。不過，此三人的共同處在於傾向認定龍樹否定任何勝義真實，而所謂的勝義諦無非是要強調：「不存在有任何勝義真理」即是勝義真理。

本計畫第一年的研究，以吉藏與龍樹語言思想的比較研究為主，此領域研究者少。比較重要的，有 Youru Wang (2003) 的英文著作，探討《莊子》與禪宗之論言說與沉默的關係，此書所鋪陳的論點與吉藏思想有相似處，頗有參考價值。另外，Westerhoff (2009) 的專書與拙著(Ho 2010)，探討龍樹的語言思想，也可供對照。第二年則在對比龍樹與僧肇的空性思想之下，探討吉藏的存有論思想。此中特別論及 Hsueh-li Cheng (1984)、Liu Ming-wood (1994)、楊惠南 (1989)。如附錄文中所示，個人不盡同意這幾位學者的論點，並試圖徵引文本證據以提出新的看法。

研究方法

本計畫為二年期計畫，以吉藏哲學思想為主要研究對象，兼與印度初期中觀比較參照，以了解吉藏思想的創造性及相關中印思想差異。計畫所採取研究方法有三，分別為文獻研究法、哲學分析法以及比較哲學法。

藉由「文獻研究法」，以吉藏、僧肇的《肇論》以及初期中觀的論書為對象，輔以

CBeta 電子佛典集成，從事論書的閱讀、理解、整理、摘要、對照等工作。相關結果已存於特定 DOC 文件檔內，甚有利於論文的撰寫。「哲學分析法」進一步詮釋相關論著的文義，批判地分析、檢討其思想意蘊。此中著重對書中主要哲學名相之意義的分析，確認其意義使用的一致性或不否；分析相關議題與觀點，探討其預設、內在結構、理路開展以及可能意涵，發展其思想意蘊，乃至揭露其問題或理論困局。「比較哲學法」針對不同的哲學思想進行比較，確認其各自特色與異同關係，乃至進一步予以融通綜合，開展出新的思想觀念。本計畫涉及吉藏與印度中觀思想的比較研究，試圖了解吉藏如何繼承、改造與創造性地發展後者。本研究顯示，吉藏的語言與存有論等思想的确呈顯出異於印度中觀佛學的風格，雖說也有一定程度的相似性。

結果與討論

本研究第一年閱讀與研究《中觀論疏》、《三論玄義》、《二諦義》、《大乘玄論》、《淨名玄論》等古代文獻，也閱讀相關專書與期刊論文。其後，針對吉藏的語言思想撰寫英文學術論文一篇，扣緊吉藏對於言語與沉默之關係的見解，題為“The Nonduality of Speech and Silence: A Comparative Analysis of Jizang’s Thought on Language and Beyond”。本論文先前於德國漢堡大學佛學研究中心主辦之 International Symposium at Hamburg University: Indian Buddhist Thought in 6th-7th Century China 國際研討會發表，其後投稿國際期刊 *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy*，並為該刊接受刊登於 2012 年第一期第 1-19 頁。

此論文篇幅頗長，超過一萬字。一個原因是因為比較吉藏與龍樹二人的語言思想。其次是由於有國際審稿人不認同筆者對於龍樹的詮釋，而需要費心提出相關文本證據以及理由說明。由於本文全文已登錄於國科會個人著作資料內，於此僅將此論文英文摘要列之如下：

Abstract Jizang 吉藏 (549–623 CE), the key philosophical exponent of the Sanlun 三論 tradition of Chinese Buddhism, based his philosophy considerably on his reading of the works of Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE), the founder of the Indian Madhyamaka school. However, although Jizang sought to follow Nāgārjuna closely, there are salient features in his thought on language that are notably absent from Nāgārjuna’s works. In this paper, I present a philosophical analysis of Jizang’s views of the relationship between speech and silence and compare them with those of Nāgārjuna. I first elaborate on Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of twofold truth and discuss his thought concerning the relationship between language and ineffable quiescence. I then examine Jizang’s interpretation of the doctrine. Thereafter, I distinguish silence *qua* teaching from silence *qua* principle and examine Jizang’s views on the relationship between speech and these two kinds of silence. It is shown that while Nāgārjuna leans toward affirming a clear-cut distinction between speech and the ineffable quiescence, Jizang endorses the nonduality of conventional speech and sacred silence.

本研究第二年特別致意於吉藏的《中觀論疏》、《二諦義》、《大乘玄論》、《淨名玄論》、《維摩經義疏》以及僧肇的《肇論》、《注維摩詰經》等書，也閱讀相關專書與期刊論文。如

前述，國際學者對於印度中觀學的「勝義諦」有新穎的解釋。龍樹本人對於勝義諦或諸法實相的解說甚少，難以判斷他真正的看法。僧肇於《肇論》也多未對「真諦」一詞作進一步說明。不過，他於〈涅槃無名論〉裡將涅槃等同於真諦，並解釋涅槃為某種主客合一的空寂境界。以此為線索，本研究進一步探討吉藏的相應見解，顯示他的無得中道進路與此境界的相關性。研究成果以“The Way of Nonacquisition: Jizang’s Philosophy of Ontological Indeterminacy”為題，發表於政治大學哲學系主辦的 Second Workshop on the Indian Buddhist Thought in 6th-7th Century China。此工作坊論文預計編為專書論文集，並由德國漢堡大學出版社出版，目前該論文仍在審查中，茲將該文置於附錄以供參考。

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四、計畫成果自評

研究成果第一篇論文，比較吉藏與龍樹的存在觀與語言思想，論證吉藏異於龍樹地採持「語默不二」思想，顯示此思想的特殊意義與價值。國際學界尚未針對印度與中國中觀學之語言思想進行比較研究，有關「語默關係」的比較研究更是闕如。本研究彌補國際學界相關研究的闕無，也顯示佛教中國化過程中，於語言思想上所難以避免的轉變。此論文雖比較吉藏與龍樹語言思想，但並未深入討論當代西方哲學的相應論點，是本文的不足處。

第二篇論文環繞「無得」與「中道」等概念，討論吉藏對於諸法實相的見解。此文根據僧肇與吉藏存有論思想的關係，提出異於國內與國際學者的見地，顯示他的見解既非肯定客觀形上實在，也不是僅僅強調某種主體心境，此一研究也應有其學術貢獻。由於尚未全面地參考運用吉藏的著作，使得文中立論有理據不足的可能，還有待來日進一步研究。

本計畫執行期間，由於研究、教學以及服務諸多工作，投入計畫執行的時間多少受到壓縮，以致研究工作進展速度稍慢。不過，仍順利完成兩篇論文，其中第一篇論文已刊登於國際期刊，第二篇論文也已提交專書論文集外審。整體而言，本計畫執行順利，並已達成原先的設定目標。

五、附錄

The Way of Nonacquisition: Jizang's Philosophy of Ontic Indeterminacy

I.

Jizang (吉藏, 549–623 CE) is the principal philosophical exponent of the Sanlun (三論) tradition of Chinese Buddhism and is the most creative and important Chinese Mādhyamika thinker. In developing his philosophy, he drew to a great extent on his reading of the works of Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE), the founder of the Madhyamaka school of Indian Buddhism, and some other Indian Mādhyamikas. His thinking was also shaped by the ideas and teachings of several Sanlun thinkers before him, chiefly Sengzhao (僧肇, 374–414 CE), Sengquan (僧詮), and Falang (法朗, 507–581 CE). Most notable among these thinkers was Sengzhao. A key forerunner of the Sanlun tradition, Sengzhao set the tone for the development of Sanlun thought with his widely influential work, the *Zhaolun* (肇論). He was influenced in his philosophical thinking and phrasing by the contemporary current of thought known as “Dark Learning” (*xuanxue* 玄學). Jizang, by contrast, may appear consciously to distance himself

from non-Buddhist Chinese thoughts. However, inheriting a tradition of somewhat Sinicized Mādhyamika thought, Jizang's own philosophy remains different in a few aspects from that of Indian Madhyamaka.

According to Jizang, all things are empty of determinate form or nature. For him, much of what things are taken to be is such only relative to the current situation and the observer's conceptual scheme or perspective; there is no ultimate, perspective-free determination of things as what they are. We may thus ascribe to Jizang the indeterminacy thesis, such that all things are ontologically indeterminate: given any x , no predicate can be truly and conclusively applied to x in the sense of predicating a determinate property of it.

Jizang's philosophy of ontic indeterminacy is connected closely with his views on the Way (*dao* 道) and nonacquisition (*wude* 無得).¹ In his construal of the Indian Mādhyamika doctrine of twofold truth, conventional and supreme truths are actually two expedient teachings meant to make explicit the Way, which seems to be a kind of ineffable principle (*li* 理) of actuality. However, Jizang also equates the Way with nonacquisition, which is roughly a conscious state of freedom from any attachment and definite understanding whatsoever.² The issue then becomes pressing as to how are to understand Jizang's notion of the Way. Does it indicate some metaphysical principle or reality? Is it actually a skillful expedient to lead one to the consummate state of complete spiritual freedom? Again, how is this issue related to Jizang's conception of ontic indeterminacy? Unlike Nāgārjuna, whose works have been studied intensively by modern scholars, Jizang's philosophy has received only scant attention. Herein, I examine Jizang's key writings in an attempt to clarify his ontological position.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I first elucidate briefly Nāgārjuna's doctrine of emptiness, then, in view of the remarkable resemblances between

¹ Jizang's notion of nonacquisition will be explained in Section 3. Briefly, the terms "nonacquisition," "nonabidingness" (*wuzhu* 無住), "nonattachment" (*wuzhi* 無執), and "nondependence" (*wuyi* 無依) are, for him, interchangeable; see his *Bailun shu* (百論疏), T42: 1827.234c21–22. Given this interchangeableness, and because Jizang occasionally couples "nonacquisition" with "correct intuition" (*zhengguan* 正觀), it would seem that the notion concerns a certain conscious state of mind.

² Definite understanding (*jueding jie* 決定解) is basically people's conventional understanding that takes things as definitely such and such. Regarding the Mādhyamika notion of linguistic fabrication (*prapañca*) as a root cause of our being entangled in the cycle of rebirth, Jizang distinguishes between linguistic fabrication (*xilun* 戲論) based on craving and that based on understanding: the former concerns people's grasping attachment to things, the latter refers to people's definite understanding. See *Zhongguanlun shu* (中觀論疏), T42: 1824.12b25–27.

Sengzhao's and Jizang's Sanlun thought, I elaborate on Sengzhao's interpretation of the doctrine. In Section 3, I discuss and examine Jizang's philosophy in relation to nonacquisition and ontic indeterminacy. Section 4 deals with the central issue of this paper; here, I offer a sustained analysis of Jizang's notion of the Way in order to clarify his ontological position. Section 5 concludes the paper with final remarks.

II.

As noted before, Sengzhao had a tremendous influence on the subsequent development of the Sanlun tradition, so it is advisable in any investigation of Jizang's thought to first present Sengzhao's. Now, both Jizang's and Sengzhao's thought owe a great debt to the works of early Indian Mādhyamika thinkers, so we first review the doctrine of emptiness propounded by Nāgārjuna in his *magnum opus*, the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*.

For Nāgārjuna, all things originate dependently (*pratītyasamutpanna*) in that their coming to be, changing, and perishing depend on various causes and conditions. The relationship of dependency includes not only sequential causal relations, and mereological relations between an object and its parts, but also relations of notional codependence.³ On the ground that they originate dependently, things are said to be empty (*śūnya*) in the sense of being devoid of self-nature (*svabhāva*) where by "self-nature" Nāgārjuna means, roughly, a self-existent, causally unconditioned, and unchanging nature or existence that a thing may be believed to possess. In his view, putative self-natures are conceptual constructs that are illicitly reified and embedded in the world.

Significantly, the dependent origination and consequential emptiness of a thing strips it of any unchanging, substantial ground and allows its deeply illusory character to be recognized. Thus, Nāgārjuna resorts to figurative cases of a phantom, a dream, a reflection, bubbles, and so forth, to indicate the ultimately illusory character of things. However, he upholds a doctrine of twofold truth, which draws a thin line between supreme truth (*paramārthasatya*) and conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*). From the perspective of conventional truth, things in the world are (conventionally) real. It is only from the perspective of supreme truth that they are said to be illusory.

For Nāgārjuna, it seems, supreme truth is simply Suchness (*tattva*) as the true nature of things, the way things really are, the characteristics of which are indicated in MMK 18.7, 18.9 to be ineffable, inconceivable, quiescent, and undifferentiated. Later Mādhyamikas equate

³ Nagao (Nagao, 1989: 12, 40) takes the relationship to be mutual relativity and dependence (*parasparāpekṣā*). For a discussion of notional dependence, see Westerhoff, 2009: 26–29, 95–98.

Suchness with *emptiness*. However, Nāgārjuna also holds that emptiness is itself empty. This, above all, has led a number of contemporary scholars to interpret him as repudiating anything metaphysical and to contend on his behalf that the supreme truth is that there is no supreme truth, that there is no such thing as the way things really are.⁴ This interpretation is in direct contrast to the metaphysical interpretation, adopted by some scholars, that takes Suchness to be an objective reality or principle, the intuition of which can bear one across the ocean of samsara. However, I shall not discuss this intricate issue here.⁵

Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什, 344–413 CE), a prestigious scholar and translator of Indian extraction, and a teacher of Sengzhao, translated into Chinese the MMK together with a commentary attributed to an Indian commentator named Piṅgala (青目). The resultant work is known as *Zhonglun* (中論), the *Middle Treatise*. Remarkably, he translates the Sanskrit term *svabhāva* in the MMK as “determinate nature” (*dingxing* 定性) as well as as “self-nature” (*zixing* 自性). In addition, he uses the term “determinate form” (*dingxiang* 定相) not infrequently in his translation of the commentary.⁶ Such usage must have influenced the direction of Chinese Mādhyamika thinking. For Sengzhao, the myriad things, when apprehended by the mind or intellect, appear to have various forms, which prompt people to use nominal words to designate them. However, they are codependent, nonsubstantial, and devoid of any determinate form or nature; they are then said to be empty and unreal. A human face, for instance, is neither beautiful nor ugly in itself. It is through delusional conception that we apprehend in it a determinate form, cognize it as definitely beautiful or otherwise, and come to have an attachment thereto.⁷

In Sengzhao’s system, there is no ready-made mind-independent world with a determinate

⁴ See Siderits, 1989, Garfield, 2002, and Westerhoff, 2009.

⁵ For further discussion on the issue, see Ho, 2012.

⁶ The use of the term “determinate” to refer to things of self-nature may be Kumārajīva’s own idea. Both “determinate nature” and “determinate form” occur in his Chinese translation of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra*, the *Weimojie suoshuo jing* (維摩詰所說經). However, the corresponding passages in the extant Sanskrit text of the sutra contain no word that expresses the sense of determinacy. See T14: 475.545a12, 548b25–27, and *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa sūtra* 2006: 50, 73.

⁷ Nowadays, many would think that being beautiful is not a property of objects, but merely the content of a subjective judgment that may vary from person to person. However, I use the example to retain the flavor of the original thought. See *Zhu Weimojiejing* (注維摩詰經), T38: 1775.386b18–20, 389b21–22; *Zhaolun*, T45: 1858.156b17–18, 159b20–21. Among the four essays in the *Zhaolun* that are traditionally attributed to Sengzhao, the authenticity of the essay “Nirvana Is Nameless” has been questioned by a few contemporary scholars. I concur with many others that the essay was basically penned by Sengzhao himself.

structure that empirical investigation can reveal to us, a world that houses properly sliced *res* waiting to be labeled accurately by the corresponding words. The way the myriad things ordinarily appear to us is already saturated with concepts, which yet cannot accurately represent the way things really are. Following Indian Madhyamaka, Sengzhao emphasizes the notion of notional codependence.⁸ We know that many concepts are interdependent and complementary, forming such pairs as “long” and “short,” “something” and “nothing,” “life” and “death,” and so on. Indeed, given any word *X*, we can always coin a word, say, *non-X* to form a pair of codependence. Just as Nāgārjuna takes a father and a son to be interdependent, Sengzhao claims that there is no existence without nonexistence, and no nonexistence without existence.⁹ This claim probably derives from the idea that, given the ubiquity of concepts in our daily experience, we cannot really bypass notional codependence and focus solely on existential causality in order to attend to things in the world. Thus, we can cognize something *as* existent, involving the concept of existence, only when we are aware of nonexistent items of which the concept of nonexistence can be predicated. Consequently, or so it seems, there is no *existence* without *nonexistence*, and vice versa.

It is presumably on such grounds, together with the thought that words cannot match anything real, that Sengzhao argues for the nonreality of all things:¹⁰

The *Zhonglun* says, “Things are neither this nor that.”¹¹ Yet, one person takes this to be *this* and that to be *that*, while another takes this to be *that* and that to be *this*. This and that are not determined by one word [say, “this” or “that”], but deluded people think they must be so. Then, *this* and *that* are originally nonexistent, whereas to the deluded they are existent from the beginning. Once we realize that *this* and *that* do not exist, then, is there anything that can be considered existent? Thus, we know that the myriad things are not real; they have for

⁸ For a discussion of *notional dependence* and *existential dependence*, see Westerhoff, 2009: 26–29.

⁹ Such a claim does not merely concern notional dependence; see *Zhaolun*, T45: 1858.159a27–b3, and *Zhu Weimojiejing*, T38: 1775.332c29–333a2, 348c13–16. Then, it may appear to conflate existential dependence and notional dependence.

¹⁰ *Zhaolun*, T45: 1858.152c23–28: 中觀云，物無彼此。而人以此為此，以彼為彼，彼亦以此為彼，以彼為此。此彼莫定乎一名，而惑者懷必然之志。然則，彼此初非有，惑者初非無。既悟彼此之非有，有何物而可有哉？故知萬物非真，假號久矣。 Incidentally, it is not my purpose here to examine the soundness of Sengzhao’s argumentation.

¹¹ It is stated in Piṅgala’s commentary that “there is in the real nature of things neither this nor that;” see T30: 1564.30c8: 諸法實相無有此彼。 However, the idea expressed here is rather reminiscent of a passage in the *Zhuangzi* (莊子); see *Zhuangzi yinde* 4/2/27–33.

long been provisional appellations!

A thing may be referred to by the demonstrative “this” and taken by the speaker as *this*. Yet, it would be the referent of “that” and taken as *that* in respect of another speaker some distance away. The thing is not fixed by “this” or “that,” not definitely *this* or *that*. Sengzhao can then apply this observation to all referring expressions and their intended referents. Things conventionally referred to by the word *X* are not to be determined by the word: they are not things endowed with a determinate *X*-form. They are not definitely so and so, and there cannot be any sharp demarcation between them and things referred to by the word *non-X*.

From the ontic indeterminacy of things, Sengzhao appears to conclude, rather hastily, their nonexistence. However, his overall philosophy does not support such a one-sided conclusion. For him, the myriad things are neither existent nor nonexistent, though they can be said provisionally to be existent and nonexistent. They can be said to be nonexistent on the grounds that they are codependent and empty of permanent and determinate nature. They can be said to be existent because they arise endowed with forms and are responsive to causal conditions. They are neither permanent entities nor sheer nothings.¹² Therefore, we should read the above-quoted passage as primarily asserting the nonexistence of things *qua* linguistically determined. Since the myriad things, unlike the ineffable supreme truth discussed below, are properly expressible and so tend to be mistaken as determinate, they are here provisionally said to be not real.

Meanwhile, Sengzhao appears to acknowledge the completely quiescent true nature of the myriad things, which is typically termed supreme truth (*zhendi* 真諦). This supreme truth is characterized as formless, nameless, and real, which means it is conceptually indeterminable. It is said that a sage’s sacred mind illuminates formless supreme truth. Then, we seem to arrive at *something* as how things really are independently of the concepts we happen to employ. As the way things really are goes beyond the grip of concepts, it is simultaneously structureless, perhaps like an amorphous lump, to be carved up using our conceptual scheme into the things that we take to be constitutive of our world.

Significantly, Sengzhao’s stance is to emphasize the nonduality of the way of supreme truth and the myriad things of conventional truth (*sudi* 俗諦). For him, the fact of there being two truths does not dictate that there be two types of thing. Equating the supreme and conventional truth respectively with nonacquisition and acquisition (*youde* 有得),¹³ he

¹² *Zhaolun*, T45: 1858.152b18–c20, 156b11–13; *Zhu Weimojiejing*, T38: 1775.332c27–29.

¹³ In Sengzhao’s writings, the word “acquisition” basically means the delusional-conceptual obtention of

contends that the two principles designated by the two terms, “nonacquisition” and “acquisition,” are not different.¹⁴ This explains why, while speaking of the myriad things as being nonreal, Sengzhao famously avers that people have the real (*zhen* 真) right before eyes without their knowing it, and that the real is precisely where we are in contact with things (*Zhaolun*, T45: 1858.151a27–28, 153a4–5).

As we just saw, Sengzhao seems to equate supreme truth with nonacquisition, conventional truth with acquisition. He states, elsewhere, that the real arises by dint of nonattachment, whereas the unreal occurs on account of attachment. He repudiates any acquisition of nonacquisition. All this indicates that Sengzhao may deny the existence of any higher reality or objective truth and affirm and find soteriological value in only the subjective state of freedom from any acquisition whatsoever. However, it is also implied in the *Zhaolun* that supreme truth is the ineffable and formless *principle*, the profoundly quiescent pinnacle of all things, which is to be illuminated by sacred mind. This is a puzzling issue, similar to the one we mentioned at the beginning of the paper in respect of Jizang’s notion of the Way. The difficulty of resolving the issue lies in the fact that Sengzhao does not explain his notion of supreme truth in detail.

The best way to solve the problem, I believe, is by considering Sengzhao’s understanding of the notion of nirvana, because the latter presumably concerns that which is considered ultimate in his philosophy. Indeed, he cites approvingly a line from a sutra to the effect that supreme truth is the way of nirvana.¹⁵ Sengzhao discusses nirvana fairly extensively, so we are in a position to ascertain his conception of supreme truth. In this context, the following passage is the most noteworthy:¹⁶

Things [in reality] have no form of existence or nonexistence. Sages have no knowing of existence or nonexistence. ... There is no figure in the exterior, no [objectifying] mind in the interior. Both the [exterior and interior] are quiescently ceased; both things and oneself

something that is taken as real and is an object of attachment. The word “nonacquisition,” by contrast, signifies the absence of such an obtention. See *Zhu Weimojiejing*, T38: 1775.377c18–26, and *Zhaolun*, T45: 1858.161b1–4.

¹⁴ *Zhaolun*, T45: 1858.152b12–18. It would seem that the two *truths* are two *principles*. In any case, I here use the word “truth” in a nonstandard sense such that supreme truth can be characterized as formless and nameless.

¹⁵ *Zhaolun*, T45: 1858.159a26–27. It is here said that conventional truth consists of existent and nonexistent things.

¹⁶ *Zhaolun*, T45: 1858.159c8–11: 法無有無之相，聖無有無之知。……於外無數，於內無心。彼此寂滅，物我冥一，怕爾無朕，乃曰涅槃。 See also T45: 1858.161a17–19, 161b7–9.

are harmoniously one. Being tranquil and traceless, this state is termed *nirvana*.

Clearly, Sengzhao takes nirvana to be a state of quiescence in which oneself and things, heaven and earth, and even past and present, are undifferentially equal and harmoniously one. Here, presumably, the myriad things lose their identities; there is nothing to be acquired, not even nonacquisition itself.¹⁷

Arguably, Sengzhao's notion of supreme truth signifies such a nondual and indeterminable state of quiescence. If so, supreme truth is formless without being an objective, higher reality. It can be characterized as nonacquisition, and yet is not purely mental or subjective. This observation provides us with a significant clue for interpreting Jizang's notion of the Way.

III.

Just as Nāgārjuna sought to render explicit some implications of the Buddha's teaching about the causally conditioned state of things by emphasizing their emptiness, Jizang deepened Nāgārjuna's teaching about the emptiness of things by highlighting nonacquisition as the main intention behind all Mahayana scriptures.¹⁸ The term "nonacquisition" frequently recurs in Kumārajīva's translations of Mahayana sutras. There, it often implies that because all things are in reality empty and illusory, there is no real and substantial thing as such that can be conceptually grasped, or even attained.¹⁹ In Jizang's thought, to have acquisition with respect to a thing is to take it as having a determinate and substantial nature such that one abides in its presumed determinate reality and depends on that reality in daily life, thereby becoming attached to it and losing one's spiritual freedom.²⁰ Alternatively, to have acquisition with

¹⁷ However, given the nonduality of supreme truth and conventional truth, the identities of the myriad things are not really erased. Thus, Sengzhao speaks of a sage's having his mind mirroring all things as they are while realizing the quiescent oneness of himself and the things; see *Zhu Weimojiejing*, T38: 1775.372c19–24.

¹⁸ While, as hinted in MMK 24.18 and Lindtner 1987: 65, v. 68, Nāgārjuna construes the Buddha's notion of dependent origination as *emptiness*, Jizang, in his *Erdi yi* (二諦義), takes Nāgārjuna's notion of emptiness to be synonymous with *nonacquisition*. See T45: 1854.106a18.

¹⁹ In a passage of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra*, the term "nonacquisition" (*anupalambha*) signifies not having the view of oneself and of other things; see *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa sūtra* 2006: 50. It is implied that, with nonacquisition, one would not take anything to be a real and nonempty object. Commenting on the *Weimojie suoshuo jing*, Jizang, based on Sengzhao's interpretation, takes the term to mean the mind's nonobtainment of all dharmas, especially delusional conception and external things. See *Weimojing yishu* (維摩經義疏), T38: 1781.959b04–10.

²⁰ The notion of dependence here is used not in the Nāgārjunian sense, but as indicating the opposite of spiritual freedom.

respect to a view is to affirm it as definitely true of reality and become attached to it. Jizang is emphatic that one must not abide in, or attach oneself to, anything in a spirit of acquisition.

For Jizang, just like for Sengzhao, the myriad things are ontologically indeterminate. One and the same thing can be existent for an ordinary unenlightened person, nonexistent for a sage. It may look impure and disgusting to a human, yet pure and attractive to an animal.²¹ Indeed, what one human being takes to be a tree may be just food for tree-eating bugs, a post ablaze for some meditating yogis, or a great mass of particles of indeterminate nature for a stubborn quantum physicist. Thus, much of what things are taken to be is such only relative to the current situation and the observer's conceptual scheme or perspective; there is no ultimate, perspective-free and context-free determination of things as what they are. Here, taking a thing to be determinate is to delineate it, setting it in opposition to others, which results in unfavorable dualistic views about things. Meanwhile, Jizang's contention that what we take to be things are not really different from the ineffable, indeterminable middle Way also reinforces the indeterminacy thesis that we have ascribed to him.

Now, if the two truths in Nāgārjuna's doctrine are taken as singly determinate and mutually distinct principles of actuality, there is a strong temptation to treat them as objects of acquisition and become attached to them.²² For those who have not yet begun to follow the path to liberation, attachment to conventional truth is the *de facto* mode of being, whereas those who are already on the path will be tempted to attach themselves to supreme truth; meanwhile, those who *misconstrue* the doctrine may become attached to both of the truths. In order to counter acquisition and attachment, Jizang avers that the two *truths* are just two provisional, expedient teachings meant to make explicit the nondual middle Way, which is neither supreme nor conventional:²³

The reason for taking the middle Way to be the *body* (*ti* 體) of the two truths is that the

²¹ *Erdi yi*, T45: 1854.81b6–8; *Jingming xuanlun* (淨名玄論), T38: 1780.897a14–29.

²² *Erdi yi*, T45: 1854.108c17–23; Jizang here quotes from a Buddhist sutra a statement that equates a view of acquisition with a dualistic view. In his *Dasheng xuanlun* (大乘玄論), T45: 1853.30a16–17, Jizang cites from a *Prajñāpāramitā sutra* to the effect that those who embrace duality follow acquisition, while those who embrace no duality follow nonacquisition.

²³ *Erdi yi*, T45: 1854.108b22–25: 所以明中道為二諦體者，二諦為表不二之理。如指指月，意不在指，意令得月，二諦教亦爾。二諦為表不二，意不在二，為令得於不二。是故，以不二為二諦體。Notably, Jizang also takes supreme and conventional truth to be two objective spheres of principle, namely, *emptiness* and *existence* respectively; see *Erdi yi*, T45: 1854.97b4–13 and *Zhongguanlun shu*, T42: 1824.28c28–29a3. The two principles are interdependent, so are both provisional.

two truths are meant to make explicit the nondual principle. As when one points toward the moon with a finger, his intention is not to highlight the finger, but to let others see the moon, so also with the teaching of the twofold truth. The two truths are meant to make explicit the nondual; the intention is not of duality, but to enable others to access the nondual. Thus, we take the nondual [principle] to be the body of the two truths.

Here, the Way is variously named the correct Way (*zhengdao* 正道), the nondual principle, the correct principle, the Real (*shixiang* 實相), and so forth. Significantly, it is equated with nonabidingness, nonacquisition or the like, too.

In line with his emphasis on nonacquisition, Jizang proposes the doctrines of “three levels of two truths” and “four levels of two truths.” The main concern here is to oppose any definite understanding that views the referent of a term as determinate in nature and determinable by the term; such a referent is an object for acquisition and attachment. At the first level, Jizang takes *existence* and *emptiness* to be the conventional and supreme truths, respectively. To counter people’s probable determination and acquisition of *emptiness*, *duality of existence and emptiness* is regarded as the conventional truth at the second level, while *nonduality of existence and emptiness* is the supreme truth at this level. At this level, one may make the mistake of delineating *nonduality* from *duality*, treating it as determinate, and becoming attached to it. Against such a practice, Jizang takes *both duality and nonduality* to be the conventional truth at the third level and regards *neither duality nor nonduality* as the supreme truth at this level. Even so, one may come to have acquisition in respect of the supreme truth at this third level. Thus, finally, all the truths of the three levels are said to be the conventional truth at the fourth level, which indicates that they are expedient teachings for pedagogic and therapeutic purposes, while the supreme truth at this level is the speech-forgetting and thought-ceasing (*yan wang lü jue* 言忘慮絕) state or principle.

Jizang, it seems, is here distinguishing between teaching and principle. Whatever truth that can be expressed in language belongs to the domain of *teaching*, which coincides with the conventional truth of the fourth level; by contrast, the supreme truth of this level, which lies beyond the reach of words, is the ineffable *principle* of nonacquisition. The distinction between teaching and principle, then, corresponds to that between what can be said using language and what cannot. A parallel distinction holds between what Jizang refers to as the provisional (*jia* 假) and the middle (*zhong* 中).

For Jizang, the myriad things are codependent, indeterminate, and interrelated. He

highlights the role notional codependence plays in our understanding of things. Since the words *X* and *non-X* are notionally codependent, *X* and *non-X*, which are signified by them, respectively, are not definitely *X* and *non-X*, that is, they are not what are demarcated and determined by the words when considered independently. For example, speech and nonspeech (or, silence) depend notionally on each other in order to be what they are: they are speech-*of*-nonspeech and nonspeech-*of*-speech, respectively. Such notional interdependence predicates the interweaving of (the inevitably conceptually understood) speech and nonspeech. This would then imply that speech is not definitely speech, and is in some sense nonspeech as well; likewise for nonspeech. Similarly, existence and emptiness, being notionally interdependent, are not definitely existence and emptiness. Rather, one is provisional existence, the other provisional emptiness.²⁴

The notion of *the provisional* refers to that which is interdependent, nonreal, indeterminate, and conceptually differentiated. The provisional *X* is not definitely *X*, the provisional *non-X* not definitely *non-X*; they are only provisionally said to be *X* and *non-X*. According to Jizang, however, they also point to a state that is neither *X* nor *non-X*, which is *the middle* as the ineffable, real, and ever-indeterminable Way.²⁵

Now, we may approach the middle conceptually or nonconceptually. If we approach it conceptually, then the middle, being notionally dependent on the provisional, is simply provisional in character. Jizang would again direct our attention to that which is neither middle nor provisional. Apparently, we cannot here really approach the middle nonconceptually. However, we can at least assume that we are referring to the middle as such, taken precisely as the aforesaid speech-forgetting and thought-ceasing state. Here, based on textual evidence such as MMK 24.18, Jizang proclaims the nonduality of the middle and the provisional, which amounts to the nonduality of the Real and the illusory, and of what cannot be said using language and what can be so said. Indeed, to draw a clear-cut distinction between the middle and the provisional is to delineate them and unfavorably fall prey to dualistic thinking. Jizang's philosophical practice aims at transcending all types of dualistic thought. Just like Sengzhao, he dismisses as inadmissible any acquisition of nonacquisition.

²⁴ *Dasheng xuanlun*, T45: 1853.24a9–14. As noted above, existence and emptiness can be regarded as conventional and supreme truth respectively. Here, the two truths are provisional in character.

²⁵ *Zhongguanlun shu*, T42: 1824.61c25: “Only this one principle [of the Real] is designated as real; all else are illusory” (唯此一理名之為實，自斯以外並皆虛妄). Yang (Yang, 1989: 130) takes this statement to show that Jizang affirms the existence of an absolute truth.

IV.

We began, in this paper, with the question of how to understand Jizang's notion of the Way. Does it indicate some metaphysical principle or reality? Or is it rather a useful expedient to lead one to the consummate state of complete nonacquisition? Apart from equating the Way with nonacquisition, Jizang appears to take the correct principle to be a state of mind in which any form of teaching, whether Buddhist or not, is completely quiescent. In addition, he refers to the Real as the complete nondependent state of the mind that is free from any judgment.²⁶ All this suggests that he probably dispensed with any notion of higher reality and attended merely to the subjective state of complete freedom from any acquisition whatsoever. This explains his therapeutic use of words and his claim that once one has freed oneself from acquisition, nonacquisition must be relinquished as well.

According to Hsueh-li Cheng, the Mādhyamika notion of emptiness is mainly a soteriological device that is meant to empty the mind of cravings and to suggest that enlightenment is the abandonment of conceptual thinking. In his view, for Jizang and other Sanlun thinkers, no reality is really real, no truth is truly true. All truths given by the Buddha are merely provisional instruments used to eradicate extreme views; they are pragmatic in nature and eventually have to be dispensed with (Cheng, 1984: 53, 98–99). Endorsing a similar position, Ming-wood Liu writes,

In thus making non-attachment the sole criterion of truth, [Jizang] empties the concept of truth of any determinate content. And if he still refers to some statements and beliefs as true, he makes it perfectly plain that his primary consideration is their efficacy in refuting false views and cultivating non-attachment. (Liu, 1994: 103)

He points out that, for Jizang, words such as “Way” and “principle” express only the spirit of nonacquisition rather than any ineffable absolute Way or principle. Indeed, to think otherwise and to affirm the Way or principle as real would only contravene the spirit of nonacquisition itself.

Both Cheng and Liu rightly highlight the therapeutic and pragmatic dimensions of Jizang's thought. Their stance somehow echoes that of a number of contemporary scholars of Indian Madhyamaka, who hold that Nāgārjuna's insistence on the groundlessness of all things invalidates any positing of a higher metaphysical reality in the system. Nevertheless, Jizang usually refers approvingly to the Way without directly equating it with some subjective state,

²⁶ See *Sanlun xuanyi* (三論玄義), T45: 1852.6c12–16, and *Zhongguanlun shu*, T42: 1864.124a4–5.

and for him, though words have a therapeutic use, they also function as an expedient device that can indicate the ineffable principle.²⁷ He clearly characterizes the Way as real, and when he appears to repudiate the Way or the like, he may be repudiating the linguistic determination imposed thereon or any conceptual acquisition thereof. All this seems to indicate that he acknowledges the existence of some real ineffable principle. Thus, we face a problem similar to that which we encountered in Nāgārjuna and Sengzhao concerning the ontological status of supreme truth.

We saw in Section 2 that Sengzhao takes nirvana to be an indeterminable nondual state of complete quiescence wherein both oneself and things are undifferentially equal and harmoniously one, and this seems to be what he has in mind when speaking of supreme truth. This point provides us a valuable clue for resolving our problem.

To begin with, Jizang occasionally refers, approvingly, to the abovequoted *Zhaolun* passage to explicate the notion of nirvana, which he identifies with the Way. In addition, he, commenting on MMK 18.9, appears to rephrase the passage to explain the notion of the Real:²⁸

By ridding of the two kinds of linguistic fabrication, one knows that things [in reality] have no different forms of existence and nonexistence, and the mind has no conception of existence and nonexistence. Thus, ... there is no [objectifying] mind in the interior, ... no figure in the exterior. Both the [interior and exterior] are quiescently ceased, all being greatly equal. This is named the Real.

It seems plausible that Jizang follows Sengzhao closely in taking the Real to be an ineffable nondual quiescence wherein both oneself and things are equal and conceptually undifferentiated.

In fact, Jizang's phrasing is much less Daoistic than Sengzhao's, and he does not stress the harmonious oneness of oneself and things as Sengzhao does. However, Jizang, like Sengzhao and other Sanlun thinkers before him, approaches the issue from the subject-object

²⁷ I am referring to Jizang's employment of the famous simile of a finger pointing to the moon. A related issue concerns how one can say meaningfully of something that it is unsayable. For discussions on these two issues, see Ho, 2008.

²⁸ *Zhongguanlun shu*, T42: 1824.128a8–11: 既無二種戲論，則知法無有無之異，心無有無分別。……無心於內；……無數於外。彼此已寂滅，浩然大均，名為實相。 Sengzhao has, in his *Zhaolun* (T45: 1858.161a15), used the phrase “all being greatly equal” (浩然大均) to describe nirvana.

perspective. He frequently refers to a state in which both the interior and exterior, the apprehension and apprehended, have ceased, becoming quiescent. This, for him, is one significant point that distinguishes the Buddhist from the non-Buddhist teaching: “The outsiders [Confucians and Daoists] do not realize the abeyance of both object and cognition, while the insiders [Buddhists] have reached the quiescence of both the apprehended and apprehension.”²⁹ Alternatively, he speaks of the nonduality of object and cognition.

For Jizang, the notion of the middle requires that one transcend both the (one-sided) subjective and objective dimensions of human experience. Thus he comments on MMK 1.8:³⁰

The real subtle dharma lies beyond object and cognition. As it lies beyond object, there is no object to be apprehended; as it lies beyond cognition, there is nothing that apprehends. ... being neither the apprehended nor the apprehension, ... [the Real] is provisionally named the middle.

The fact is probably not that no reality is really real, but that the Real is nowhere apprehensible in a conceptual experience. Surely, what is transcended here is a cognitive mind, not a mind of nonacquisition. However, while the Way *can* be indicated as a nondependent mental state of nonacquisition, to reduce the former to the latter would be to fall one-sidedly on the subjective dimension, which does not tally well with Jizang’s emphasis on the nonduality of subject and object.

The discussion so far may suggest that the Way is completely quiescent and negative. However, Jizang also holds that if one approaches the Way in an attitude of nonacquisition, it is virtually the same as the myriad things.³¹

Because the great way of equality is ubiquitously nonabiding, all [its determinations] are to be negated. Because it is ubiquitously nonhindering, all things can be equated with it. If one views affirmation as affirmation, negation as negation, all affirmations and negations are to be negated. If one knows that there is no affirmation or non-affirmation, no negation or

²⁹ *Sanlun xuanyi*, T45: 1852.2a13–14: 外未境智兩泯，內則緣觀俱寂。See also *Jingming xuanlun*, T38: 1780.870a8–11, 871c12–21.

³⁰ *Zhongguanlun shu*, T42: 1824.50c14–51a02: 真實微妙法者，此法絕於境智。以絕境故，無境可緣；絕於智故，無有能緣。……非緣、非觀，……強名為中。

³¹ *Dasheng xuanlun*, T45: 1853.42a28–b3: 平等大道無方無住故，一切並非，無方無礙故，一切並得。若以是為是、以非為非者，一切是非並皆是非也。若知無是無非是、無非無不非，假名為是非者，一切是非並皆是也。

non-negation, that they are only provisionally said to be so and so, then, all affirmations and negations are to be affirmed.

As the Way is nonabiding, it is exclusively neither the exterior nor the interior but both at once. It is quiescent and negative, primarily because all the conceptual determinations have ceased or are negated in relation to it. Herein the myriad things are not erased; rather, they are conceptually undifferentiated. This partially explains the aforesaid nonduality of the middle (the Way) and the provisional (the myriad things). In line with the nonduality, Jizang contends that, for a sage, the quiescence of both the apprehended and apprehension goes hand in hand with the apparent manifestation of object and cognition.³²

According to Jizang, the myriad things are ontologically indeterminate in that nothing is endowed with a determinate form or nature. Another aspect of his philosophy of ontic indeterminacy is that the ineffable Way is fully indeterminable, which reinforces the indeterminacy thesis that we have attributed to Jizang. As the Way is indeterminable and nonabiding, all its conceptual determinations are to be negated; it cannot be determined as X or non-X, say, as empty or nonempty, as Buddha-nature or non-Buddha-nature. In addition, it cannot be confined to the subjective or objective dimension of human experience. It supposedly contains all things in an undifferentiated nondual state of quiescence. Once this is understood, one can indirectly and provisionally refer to the Way as empty or nonempty, and so forth. Presumably, this allows Jizang to speak of it sometimes objectively and sometimes subjectively, which makes it difficult to ascertain his genuine stance. We see here that Jizang's conception of ontic indeterminacy is closely related to the issue of the nature of the Way.

V.

In this paper, I have, in light of Sengzhao's discussion on nirvana, interpreted Jizang's puzzling notion of the Way. In my opinion, Jizang's ontological system can roughly be said to consist of two interweaving layers: the layers of the middle and of the provisional. The middle is the conceptually indeterminable nondual quiescence of oneself and things, which is known,

³² The corresponding Chinese sentence is: 至人緣觀俱寂，而境智宛然；see *Jingming xuanlun*, T38: 1780.867b15–16. Jizang then echoes a line from the *Zhaolun* by stating that “as [the sage's] response gets more active, his spirit becomes more tranquil; as his cognition gets more quiescent, the illumination [of his mind] becomes more brilliant” (應愈動，神愈靜，智愈寂，照愈明). This reminds us of the *Daodejing* (道德經) formula of “doing nothing and yet doing all things” (無為無不為).

above all, as the Way. It is only revealed in fully nonconceptual experience and is indicated as speech-forgetting and thought-ceasing. It harbors within itself the myriad things in their undifferentiated state. The middle is intimately interwoven with the provisional, which comprises the myriad things in their conceptually differentiated and interdependent mode. Though empty of determinate form and nature, the things are properly and directly expressible in provisional language.

Jizang does not clearly posit any nonempty metaphysical reality or principle. He does speak of the Way or the like as nonempty (as well as empty). Here, however, one purpose that he has is to highlight that the Way cannot be determined as *empty*. Another is to indicate that the Way cannot be reduced to emptiness; after all, it contains within itself all things in their undifferentiated and quiescent state.³³ The Way is not any reality metaphysically higher than the myriad things. Although it is characterized as real, it is nothing more than the ineffable quiescence wherein both oneself and external things are conceptually undifferentiated.

On the other hand, while we should respect the practical spirit in Jizang's writing, his notion of the Way does not merely concern the conscious state of freedom from any acquisition whatsoever. It does not seem correct to hold that all his truth-claims are corrective and pragmatic instead of (indirectly) indicating the Way as well. The fact is that, for him, the Way is only realized when one's mind of acquisition has ceased,³⁴ being beyond conceptual determination and attachment, it is accessible only to a mind of nonacquisition. Needless to say, the Way is also the preeminent source of soteriological value, the realization of which, according to Jizang, abolishes linguistic fabrication and the wheel of suffering.

There are merits in Jizang's notion of the Way as elucidated here, although it is hardly attractive to an analytical mind. In the line of a philosophical reconstruction, we may take the notion to point to a pre-subjective, pre-objective experience of nonacquisition. This nondual experience is equally correlated with the mind and the world of things, yet irreducible to either.

³³ Yang (Yang, 1989: 153–155) accuses Jizang of deviating from Indian Madhyamaka by endorsing the view of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* that nirvana is not empty. See *Sanlun xuanyi*, T45: 1852.4b1–4. Cf. *Zhongguanlun shu*, T42: 1824.160a8–11: “the middle way is also named *nirvana* ... because therein all encumbrances are ceased and all virtues are fulfilled. ... As all virtues are fulfilled, it is said to be nonempty; as all encumbrances are ceased, it is designated as empty” (中道亦名涅槃者，以……累無不寂，德無不圓。……德無不圓，名為不空，累無不寂，稱之為空). Here, as elsewhere in Jizang's writing, the word “empty” also connotes the sense of nonexistence.

³⁴ *Weimojing yishu*, T38: 1781.962b19–23. Jizang has identified the Way with supreme wisdom (*bore* 般若) and profound meditation (*sanmei* 三昧), but this rather suggests the comprehensiveness of the notion of the Way.

Being ineffable and conceptually undifferentiated, still, it is nothing like our daily life experience, but then, this follows inevitably from its putative soteriological functions. Meanwhile, Jizang's philosophy of ontic indeterminacy is intriguing and worthy of further investigation. However, exploring these issues would require a separate effort, which must wait for another occasion.

Notes

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List of Abbreviations

MMK = *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*. In de la Vallée Poussin (1992).

T = *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*. In Takakusu and Watanabe (1924–1935).

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