

科技部補助專題研究計畫

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僧肇與吉藏《維摩經》詮釋的哲學考察

A Philosophical Study of Sengzhao's and Jizang's Commentaries on the
Vimalakirtinirdesa

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中文摘要

本計畫為二年期研究計畫，以中國佛教三論宗思想家僧肇的《注維摩詰經》以及吉藏的《淨名玄論》與《維摩經義疏》為主要研究對象，探討僧肇與吉藏二人的《維摩經》詮釋所展現的哲學思想。也透過梵本《維摩經》等的對比研究，了解僧肇與吉藏的思想之於印度空宗思想的異同關係。計畫採取文獻研究法、哲學分析法和比較哲學法等三種研究方法。

本計畫第一年研讀《注維摩詰經》，並以僧肇《肇論》與《注維摩詰經》的空性思想為主，撰寫英文論文一篇，題為Emptiness as Subject-Object Unity: Sengzhao on the Way Things Truly Are。本文顯示，僧肇的「空性」或「真諦」概念指向一虛寂的主客合一狀態，於其中，我人自身與萬物渾合一體，尚未有概念性的分化。文中也討論萬物與空性的相即關係，並與西方相關思想比較，揭顯僧肇空的哲學的存有論意含。本計畫第二年研讀吉藏的《淨名玄論》與《維摩經義疏》，由於配合國際學者邀請撰寫專書論文，考量該專書屬性，撰寫Resolving the Ineffability Paradox一文。本文探討晚近部分佛教學者所關切的，言說不可說者所引生的矛盾問題。文中討論陳那的遮詮理論以及窺基對此論的運用，也述及印度教文法學者Bhartṛhari的解決進路，不過，本文主軸涉及僧肇與吉藏的語言思想，也運用《淨名玄論》的相關資料。

關鍵詞：僧肇、吉藏、《肇論》、《注維摩經》、《淨名玄論》、空性思想

英文摘要

Sengzhao (374?-414 CE) and Jizang (549-623 CE) are the two main philosophical exponents of the Sanlun tradition of Chinese Buddhism. This project investigates into their philosophical thoughts as revealed in their commentary works on Kumarajīva's Chinese translation of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra*. The three works that form the main focus of the project are Sengzhao's *A Commentary on the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra* (注維摩詰經) and Jizang's *A Treatise on the Profound Teaching of Vimalakīrti* (淨名玄論) and *A Commentary on the Meaning of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra* (維摩經義疏).

In the first year of the project, I studied Sengzhao's commentary, in the second year, Jizang's two commentaries. Apart from philological research, the main methods adopted in the research are philosophical analysis and comparative philosophical research. As a result of the studies, I have written two papers as book chapters. The first paper is "Emptiness as Subject-Object Unity: Sengzhao on the Way Things Truly are," which has been published. The second paper, titled "Resolving the Ineffability Paradox," is now under review.

Keywords: Sengzhao, Jizang, emptiness, the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra*

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二、報告內容

前言

本計畫為二年期研究計畫，以中國佛教三論宗思想家僧肇的《注維摩詰經》以及吉藏的《淨名玄論》與《維摩經義疏》為主要研究對象，探討僧肇與吉藏二人的《維摩經》詮釋所展現的哲學思想。也透過梵本《維摩經》等的對比研究，了解僧肇與吉藏的思想之於印度空宗思想的異同關係。計畫採文獻研究法、哲學分析法和比較哲學法等三種研究方法。研究進度上，第一年研讀《注維摩詰經》，第二年研讀《淨名玄論》與《維摩經義疏》。僧肇與吉藏對於《維摩經》「一切法空」、「不二法門」等思想的理解以及相關語言思想，是本計畫哲學考察的重點。第一年撰寫Emptiness as Subject-Object Unity: Sengzhao on the Way Things Truly are專書論文，第二年則撰寫Resolving the Ineffability Paradox一專書論文。

研究目的

1. 探討僧肇與吉藏的《維摩經》詮釋所呈現的中國中觀思想，為此國際學界少人問津的領域做出學術貢獻。
2. 透過梵本《維摩經》的對比研究，了解僧肇與吉藏的《維摩經》思想之於印度空宗思想的異同關係。
3. 使申請人對僧肇與吉藏的哲學思想有較完整、深入的認識，有利撰寫相關研究的英文專書。

本計畫原先計畫撰寫一篇國際期刊論文，但由於國際學者的邀約，轉而撰寫兩篇英文專書論文。

文獻探討

英語佛學界於中國三論思想的研究專書相當缺乏。Richard Robinson的1967年著作*Early Mādhyamika in India and China*，論述羅什至僧肇的初期三論學統並有部分著作的英文翻譯。作者指出羅什漢譯的某些問題，多少使得其後的漢地學者無法精確掌握原始中觀文本的文意。作者善於邏輯解析，但論述僧肇《注維摩詰經》的篇幅短，可參考處有限。鄭學禮(Hsueh-li Cheng)的*Empty Logic: Mādhyamika Buddhism from Chinese Sources*，依古

代中文譯著討論印度中觀思想、中觀學派對於哲學議題的處理方式等等，書中多處述及吉藏思想，但僅略提及《肇論》。作者參照康德與維根斯坦(Wittgenstein)哲學，以解釋及對比中觀思想；此一操作在細節上有可議處，但也不無可觀。此中最重要的英文著作，當屬香港廖明活(Ming-wood Liu)教授的 *Madhyamaka Thought in China* 一書。本書先簡介印度中觀教學的形成，第二、三章分別論述僧肇與吉藏的中國中觀思想，第四章則論列天台宗與禪宗教法中的中觀精神。作者是國際三論學的權威學者，學術涵養佳。此書勾勒吉藏的「無執」教學主軸及其對「判教」、「二諦」與「佛性」等議題的見解，強調吉藏思想的「無得」與「教學」面向。作者在論述上也運用《注維摩詰經》以及《淨名玄論》、《維摩經義疏》等書，因而較具參考價值。

日文佛學界有不少有關僧肇與吉藏思想的論文。日本學者的佛學研究一般較為篤實謹嚴，語言文獻學基礎良好，唯在哲學探究上嫌於保守，三論學研究也不例外。平井俊榮的《中国般若思想史研究—吉蔵と三論学派》一書，除論介中國三論宗的成立歷史外，廣泛地論述吉藏的思想論理與經典觀等，參考價值頗高。

中文學界對於僧肇思想的研究頗多。李潤生的《僧肇》、劉貴傑的《僧肇思想研究—魏晉玄學與佛教思想之交涉》以及涂艷秋的《僧肇思想探究》，都有參考價值。此中劉貴傑一書，多處徵引《注維摩詰經》，也顯示吉藏的《維摩經》詮釋深受《注維摩詰經》影響。《僧肇思想探究》對於《肇論》各篇多半有詳細的討論，正確地批評如湯用彤等人對於僧肇思想的誤解，也指出要了解僧肇必須將《肇論》與《注維摩詰經》相互配合。本書除了解析《肇論》的文學風格外，也比較龍樹《中論》與《肇論》的敘述模式，顯明僧肇著書立論所採取的肯定表詮與「隨說隨掃」方法。值得注意的是涂艷秋的《鳩摩羅什般若思想在中國》。此書第五章討論鳩摩羅什的般若思想，第六章論介僧肇對羅什思想的繼承與發展。這兩章大幅徵引《注維摩詰經》的羅什註與僧肇註，可供本計畫參考。我們大抵同意作者比較羅什與僧肇對「畢竟空」的不同詮解時所言：羅什的畢竟空是一層一層的向上翻越，僧肇則是尋求貫串現象界與實相界，連接凡夫與菩薩。有關吉藏對於《維摩經》的註釋，中文學界研究較少。廖明活的《嘉祥吉藏學說》以及楊惠南的《吉藏》二書，都有論及吉藏相關著作，有一些參考價值。其餘則主要建於期刊論文，在此不述。

梵文《維摩經》的研究，萬金川撰有〈梵文《維摩經》的發現與文本對勘研究的文化與思想轉向〉一文。此文評介日本學者對幾種《維摩經》漢譯本的討論，也比較討論梵文與藏譯《維摩經》。作者採取的翻譯與文化研究進路並非本計畫重點，不過，此文所提供的資訊及其對部分《維摩經》片段的討論則相當有用。唐秀連的〈「淨名杜口」之理趣—通析《維摩詰經》之「入不二法門」之義蘊〉，也稍涉及梵文《維摩經》。此外，程恭讓於其《華梵之間》書中，有「《維摩詰經·入不二法門品》梵本新譯及其相關問題的研究」與「《維摩詰經·佛道品》梵本新譯及其相關問題的研究」兩篇論文。

研究方法

本計畫採取文獻研究法、哲學分析法以及比較哲學法。這三種方法都與申請人過去的訓

練與研究有關，且與本計畫密切相關，因此以之為主要的研究方法。

藉由「文獻研究法」，以收錄於《大正藏》的《注維摩詰經》以及日本大正大學綜合佛教研究所 2000 年出版的《對譯注維摩詰經》為對象，輔以什譯《維摩詰所說經》、《維摩經》英譯本以及也含有支謙譯《佛說維摩詰經》與玄奘譯《說無垢稱經》的《梵藏漢对照『維摩經』》(其梵本另獨立編於《梵文維摩經—ポタラ宮所藏写本に基づく校訂》)，運用 CBeta 電子佛典集成，從事經論、注疏的閱讀、理解、整理、摘要、對照等工作。

「哲學分析法」進一步詮釋相關經論注疏的文義，批判地分析、檢討其思想意蘊。此中著重對書中主要哲學名相之意義的分析，確認其意義使用的一致性或否；分析相關議題與觀點，探討其預設、內在結構、理路開展以及可能意涵，發展其思想意蘊，乃至揭露其問題或理論困局。此方法之施用於佛教思想文本，有助於藉現代哲學術語重新建構傳統思想，顯露其可能的現代價值。

「比較哲學法」針對不同的哲學思想進行比較，確認其各自特色與異同關係，乃至進一步予以融通綜合，開展出新的思想觀念。本計畫涉及僧肇、吉藏之與印度般若、中觀思想的比較研究，試圖了解前者如何繼承與創造性地發展後者。僧肇直接或間接地為老莊玄學思想所影響，在哲學思想與語文表述上，多少呈顯出異於印度大乘佛學的風格。此外，第二年度的論文撰寫上，由於論及「不可說悖論」議題，也與西方以及印度哲學相關理論進行比較研究。

結果與討論

第一年以研讀《注維摩詰經》為主，並撰寫 *Emptiness as Subject-Object Unity: Sengzhao on the Way Things Truly Are* 專書論文。本文刊登於今年六月出版、JeeLoo Liu 與 Douglas L. Berger 所編的 *Nothingness in Asian Philosophy* 一書。本文以僧肇的《肇論》與《注維摩詰經》為主要文本，採哲學分析與理性重構進路，探討僧肇對於印度中觀學與般若傳統之「空性」概念的理解。西方學界對於印度中觀哲學家龍樹的「空性」概念，已有為數不少但內容互異的研究成果。僧肇的空性思想則仍有開拓空間，其思想與老莊道家的關係也值得探究。文中權宜地區分 *ontic* 與 *ontological* 兩個層次，相當於概念與前概念或俗諦與真諦層次。於 *ontic* 層次，萬物是空的，而其真實所是者則是 *ontological* 層次的真諦或空性。文中於 *ontic* 層次歸予僧肇「萬物無定相」的論題，並說明萬物之所以為空的因由。其次於 *ontological* 層次，討論學界對於「真諦」的理解，指出相關理解並不適用於僧肇思想。本文顯示，僧肇的「空性」或「真諦」概念指向一虛寂的主客合一狀態，於其中，我人自身與萬物渾合一體，尚未有概念性的分化。此一分化發生於概念的 *ontic* 層次。文中也討論萬物與空性的相即關係，並探討僧肇空的哲學的存有論意含。

此論文約 7000 餘字，在此僅列出此文的第一節以供參考：

The notion of emptiness figures prominently in both Indian philosophy and Chinese philosophy. In India, Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE), founder of the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism, propounded a philosophy of emptiness, according to which, because all

things are dependently originated, they are empty (*śūnya*) in the sense of being devoid of independent and unchanging existence or nature (*svabhāva*). He set forth a doctrine of two truths to the effect that things are empty and illusory from the perspective of ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*), but are real in light of conventional truth (*samvṛtisatya*). In the school, ultimate truth is equated with emptiness (*śūnyatā*). Contemporary scholars, however, differ on how best to construe the notion of ultimate truth.

With the introduction of Buddhism into China during the early centuries of the common era, the notion of emptiness (*kong* 空) soon became a focus of attention among Buddhist intellectuals. In the Wei-Jin period (220–420 CE), Chinese thinkers were typically preoccupied with the trend of thought known as “arcane learning” (*xuanxue* 玄學), which laid great emphasis on the Daoist classics *Laozi* and *Zhuangzi* as well as the notion of nothingness (*wu* 無). Given this intellectual milieu, while Chinese scholars were less likely than their Indian peers to dismiss “emptiness” as nihilistic, even Buddhist thinkers of Madhyamaka leanings might give the notion a distinctly Daoist tinge.

Sengzhao 僧肇 (374?–414 CE) is a prominent Chinese Mādhyamika philosopher, who exerted a considerable influence on later Chinese Buddhist thinking. In this paper, I seek to investigate into his exposition and adaptation of the Indian Buddhist doctrine of emptiness. This investigation shall shed light on how someone who was embedded in traditional Chinese thought would construe the notion of emptiness and take the myriad things to be empty. More significantly, Sengzhao’s philosophy of emptiness is itself philosophically interesting, challenging and well deserving of our attention.

For the sake of conceptual analysis, let us distinguish the level of the myriad things qua individuals from that of the way the things truly are and dub them respectively as the *ontic* and the *ontological* level. For Sengzhao, the ontic status of the myriad things is really empty or void, and he equates the way of the ontological level with supreme void (*zhixu* 至虛), ultimate truth (*zhendi* 真諦), emptiness, the way (*dao* 道), nirvana, even nonattachment. In the paper, I mainly use the term “emptiness” to indicate the way of the ontological level. The distinction between the two levels, however, is primarily conceptual rather than substantive, for the empty myriad things are intrinsically the same as emptiness qua the way they truly are. Here, the issues to explore are the ontic status of the myriad things, the ontological notion of emptiness as well as the relationship between the things and emptiness. I shall show that the notion points to a subject-object unity wherein both oneself and the myriad objects are conceptually undifferentiated and harmoniously one. It is also intimately related to the notion of indeterminacy such that to be empty is to be devoid of determinate form and nature. On the whole, the myriad things are indeterminate and deeply form a conceptually indeterminable whole.

In what follows, I shall offer a philosophical analysis and rational reconstruction of Sengzhao's philosophy of emptiness. In section 2, I discuss in what sense the myriad things are, for Sengzhao, empty, and ascribe to him a thesis of ontic indeterminacy. Then, in section 3, I enquire into his conception of emptiness qua subject-object unity and explicate its relationship with the myriad things. In section 4, finally, I address a few implications of the philosophy while suggesting its relevance for contemporary philosophical reflection.

計畫第二年，研讀吉藏的《淨名玄論》與《維摩經義疏》。吉藏的《維摩經義疏》時常參考僧肇《注維摩詰經》的論點，其《淨名玄論》則有不少語言議題的論述，值得參考。由於配合國際學者邀請撰寫專書論文，考量該專書屬性，撰寫 Resolving the Ineffability Paradox 一文，目前已完成初稿約 6800 餘字，並已送專書主編審查。如通過審查，將刊登於預定 2015 年 10 月由 Bloomsbury Academic 出版的 *Comparative Philosophy without Borders* 一書。本文探討晚近部分佛教學者所關切的，言說不可說者所引生的矛盾問題。文中討論陳那的遮詮理論以及窺基對此論的運用，也述及印度教文法學者 Bhartṛhari 的解決進路。不過，本文主軸涉及僧肇與吉藏的語言思想，也運用《淨名玄論》的相關資料，以提出解消不可說悖論的策略，以及回應對此策略的可能反對意見。

在此也列出此論文的第一節以及結論以供參考：

If I believe that a certain item X is ineffable for the reason that X cannot be expressed as it truly is by human concepts and words, questions arise as to how I can make this known to others *in words*, how words can be used to gesture toward X. I can't even say X is unsayable, because in *saying* so, I would have made X *sayable*. This is a time-honored conundrum known to many philosophers and religious thinkers in the East and the West. Confronting this conundrum, Augustine thinks it's better to evade the concerned verbal conflict silently than to quell it disputatiously, and early Wittgenstein famously asks us to pass over the ineffable in silence.

Indeed, a number of contemporary philosophers would agree that the unqualified statement "X is unspeakable" faces the danger of self-referential absurdity: if this statement is true, it must at the same time be false, given that X is speakable by the predicate word "unspeakable." This predicament can be formulated as the following argument, which I shall term the "ineffability paradox."

P1: X is unspeakable.

P2: The statement "X is unspeakable" is true. (From P1)

P3: X is speakable by the predicate word "unspeakable." (From P2)

P4: The statement "X is unspeakable" is not true. (From P3)

∴ The statement "X is unspeakable" is both true and not true. (From P2 and P4)

Palpably, the conclusion of this argument is a contradiction. Recently, Graham Priest reiterates that speaking of the ineffable does involve a real contradiction. However, his strategy for tackling something like the ineffability paradox, besides using the techniques of contemporary paraconsistent logic, is to aver that some contradictions are true in that they have their cause in the nature of reality, a nature that is contradictory. There are then, for Priest, contradictory statements that are true, and the statement “X is unspeakable” can well be both true and contradictory. Nevertheless, most of us would find it hard to swallow the idea of the contradictoriness of reality. Consequently, we need to come up with a different strategy for resolving the paradox.

After the linguistic turn in the early twentieth century, with so much emphasis placed on the ubiquity and significance of language, the notion of ineffability may, for many philosophers, become somewhat obsolescent, perhaps something to be left to mystics and old school metaphysicians. Then, why do we need to bother with the notion? With all due respect to language, however, we must not think that language knows no limits, as we must not think we can capture the fresh gust of present actuality in the box of past convention. It is *not* true that each and every aspect of reality is speakable in the sense of being directly and properly expressible in words. If so, the notion of ineffability can still be of relevance to contemporary philosophizing.

To explain. In its use of general terms, such as “tree” and “squirrel,” language operates in the realms of resemblance or commonness. It relies for its operation on the application of a general term to many particular objects that are held to be subsumed under the concept that corresponds to that term. For example, the word “tree” can be used, on the grounds of different trees’ resemblance to one another, to refer to any one tree or all trees. Yet, features that are really specific to a particular tree *qua* tree do not fall within the semantic range of the word. It helps little to appeal to more specific words such as “maple” or “sugar maple,” because they, as general terms, also function on the grounds of resemblance. Thus, such features can be so concrete, specific, and fine-grained that the tree evades complete linguistic determination, which must be abstract, generic, and coarse-grained. Given that words do not match the features, the tree is ineffable in at least some of its aspects.

Furthermore, if one’s repertoire of realities does not include universals and resemblances (more or less generic features that may be believed by others to inhere in things of the world), then concrete particulars such as maples and apples are wholly ineffable insofar as they are taken to be devoid of objective universals and real resemblances. Dignāga (c. 480–540 CE), a prominent Indian Buddhist epistemologist, basically takes such a stance. For him, universals

and resemblances are conceptually constructed and imposed onto real particulars, which are, in themselves, beyond the grip of words and concepts. The point for us is that the notion of ineffability may even concern objects of sense perception.

Now, if concrete particulars are ineffable, how are we to use words to refer to them? In his magnum opus, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dignāga puts forth a semantic theory of meaning known as the *apoha* (exclusion) theory, according to which a nominal word functions by excluding objects other than its own referent. The meaning of the word “maple” would then be the exclusion of non-maples. Dignāga does not explicitly address the aforesaid conundrum. However, the Chinese Yogācāra thinker Kuiji (窺基, 632–682) applies the theory to tackle the conundrum. As a first step toward resolving the ineffability paradox, I shall in the next (second) section discuss Dignāga’s and Kuiji’s relevant views on the issue.

In section 3, I first cope with the predicament of setting a limit to language. Then, I attend to a few passages in the works of the two Chinese Mādhyamika philosophers, Sengzhao (僧肇, 374?–414) and Jizang (吉藏, 549–623), and of the fifth-century Hindu grammarian philosopher Bhartṛhari to reconstruct a strategy for showing how we can gesture toward the ineffable without making contradictions. A key notion here is that of *indication* as an indirect mode of expression, the mechanism and functioning of which will be clarified. In section 4, I contrast indication with description while introducing the notion of correctness in order to resolve the ineffability paradox. Thereafter, I discuss and dismiss three other approaches for tackling the conundrum as well as two likely objections against my strategy. Section 5 concludes.

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V.

We began this paper with the time-honored linguistic-philosophical conundrum of saying the unsayable and the related ineffability paradox. For many, this issue is unresolvable, which casts doubts on the viability of the notion of ineffability. After examining the Buddhist semantic theory of *apoha* and an *apoha* solution to the issue, we resorted to certain Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical materials to rationally reconstruct a strategy for coping with the conundrum and, especially, resolving the paradox. By introducing the mode of expression termed “indication,” together with the relevant notions of superimposition and of gesturing beyond the horizon, I wish to have shown that expressing the ineffable does not necessarily involve irresolvable contradiction. It is also hoped that our philosophical exercise, unusual in conjoining Chinese Buddhism and Hindu philosophy, points to a constructive way forward for comparative philosophy.

If our strategy is on the whole persuasive, if we cannot adequately capture the fresh gust of

actuality in the box of convention, then philosophers may need to recognize the limitations of language and acknowledge the relevance of the notion of ineffability for contemporary philosophizing. Instead of belittling language, this recognition may induce one to value even more various possibly non-descriptive modes of expression such as metaphor, negation, paradox, indication, parable, poetic language, and so on. It might also prompt philosophers to attend more than is normal to the concrete, fine-grained, and tacit aspects of human life and experience, which have tended to be filtered out by abstract philosophical thinking.

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四、計畫成果自評

本計畫執行期間，個人 2012 年下半年於中央研究院文哲所從事短期研究，進行禪宗思想研究，多少壓縮了本計畫的研究時間，以致第一年度僅完成《注維摩詰經》的閱讀。第二年度，閱讀吉藏《淨名玄論》與《維摩經義疏》。由於個人自 2013 年參與一項科技部整合型專題計畫，配合該計畫閱讀、研究佛教倫理學相關文獻，期間又受邀撰寫書評等，也造成研究時間的不足，未能完全畢讀該二書。本計畫原先規劃撰寫一篇國際期刊論文，但在執行上，實際撰寫了兩篇相關國際專書論文，可說已達成計畫的預期目標。

Emptiness as Subject-Object Unity: Sengzhao on the Way Things Truly Are 一文，採哲學分析與理性重構進路，探討僧肇對於印度中觀學與般若傳統之「空性」概念的理解。西方學界對於印度中觀哲學家龍樹的「空性」概念，已有為數不少但內容互異的研究成果。僧肇的空性思想則仍有開拓空間，其思想與老莊道家的關係也值得探究。文中顯示，僧

肇的「空性」或「真諦」概念指向一虛寂的主客合一狀態，於其中，我人自身與萬物渾合一體，尚未有概念性的分化。此類觀點尚未為國際學者觸及，其呈現一種中國式的空性思想。更重要地，文中指出，僧肇相關思想與當代英美哲學的存有論的反實在論 (ontological anti-realism) 有相似之處，但是並無這理論的一些理論困難。這種進路的進一步發展，在於可以與當代的實在論-反實在論爭議對話，顯示中國中觀思想的現代價值。

Resolving the Ineffability Paradox 一文，探討晚近如 Graham Priest, Yasuo Deguchi, Jay Garfield 等部分佛教學者所關切的，言說不可說者所引生的矛盾問題。個人過去雖曾撰寫相關文章，但此議題仍有開創、補充的空間。配合「不可說」概念的導出，文中先討論印度量論哲學家陳那的遮詮理論，以及窺基如何將此論運用於解釋「不可說」一詞的運作方式。其次，討論僧肇與吉藏的語言思想，也述及印度教文法學者 Bhartṛhari 的解決進路，以建構出解決該問題的策略。之後討論其他相關進路的優缺點，以及針對本文策略的可能反對意見提出回應。文中批判 Graham Priest 等人所採取、訴諸 paraconsistent logics 的進路，顯示對僧肇、吉藏等佛教哲學家而言，終極實在應無矛盾可言。本文循比較哲學進路，觸及中國、印度以及西方哲學，特別著重顯示東方傳統哲學的資糧，有助於消解當代西方哲學難以解決的議題。